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AB S TR AC T. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) permits judicial review of "final agency
action." Agency action is "final" when it is both the "consummation of the agency's decision mak-
ing process" and a decision by which "rights.or obligations have been determined," or from which
"legal consequences will flow." Some forms of agency action uncontroversially satisfy both of these
conditions for finality. For example, "legislative rules" promulgated by agencies pursuant to con-
gressional delegations of policy-making authority after a period of public notice and comment are
certainly "final agency action" that can be challenged before their application. Other forms of
agency action pose challenges for the finality doctrine. In particular, agencies sometimes issue non-
legislative "interpretative rules" construing arguably ambiguous statutory provisions. While these
interpretative rules are often the consummation of an agency's decision-making process, do they
determine rights or obligations? Do legal consequences flow from their issuance? The Supreme
Court has only given this topic cursory treatment, and its precedents on the subject probably con-
fuse more than they clarify. Given this lack of guidance, the courts of appeals have struggled to
coalesce around a single approach to understanding the finality of interpretative rules. That said,
some courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have demonstrated increasing interest in a bright-line rule
deeming interpretative rules as nonfinal prior to enforcement. On this view, interpretative rules
never determine rights or obligations, or produce legal consequences until they are applied to a
regulated party. At the same time, however, several commentators have also argued that the legal-
consequence condition for finality should be eliminated altogether.
This Note argues that the categorical exclusion of interpretative rules from the ambit of "final
agency action" is presently unwarranted. It begins by canvassing the present doctrine and finding
it wanting. The Note then turns to the contemporaneous history surrounding the APA's enactment
for answers. Examining that history, it demonstrates that there existed a broad consensus hortly
before and after the APA's adoption that legal consequence was the central determinant for whether
a given agency action was judicially reviewable. Therefore, the academic critics of the finality doc-
trine's legal-consequence condition appear to have missed the mark. Moreover, the history demon-
strates that while courts sometimes deferred to an agency's interpretative rules, those rules lacked
the force of law because, at the end of the day, the courts always remained free to substitute their
preferred statutory interpretation for the agency's. At first blush, therefore, it might appear that
the categorical exclusion of interpretative rules from "final agency action" has a sound historic
pedigree. However, the historical unreviewability of interpretative rules hinged on the premise
that the rules could never bind the courts. But the current regime of Chevron deference undermines
that premise and should change the calculus for whether interpretative rules produce the legal
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consequences ufficient for finality. All told, any interpretative rule that is eligible for Chevron def-
erence should also be "final agency action" under the APA. The Note concludes by explaining how
a unified deference-finality doctrine might operate in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) provides for judicial review
of "final agency action."' "Agency action," as defined in the APA, covers a wide
range of policy-making tools, including rules, orders, licensing, sanctions, and
even failures to act.2 But the modified term "final agency action" is undefined,
and courts, along with commentators, have struggled for decades to discern
what characteristics render agency action "final."' Certain administrative rules -
nonlegislative rules - pose unique challenges for the finality doctrine.
Under the APA, a "rule," or "agency statement of general or particular ap-
plicability and future effect," can do many things.' Among these functions, ad-
ministrative rules can "prescribe law or policy" or "interpret" a statute or other
rule.' "Legislative rules" generally prescribe policy with the force and effect of
law. When Congress delegates rulemaking authority to an agency, the agency
effectively "stands in the place of Congress;" a legislative rule is therefore "bind-
ing upon all persons, and on the courts, to the same extent as a congressional
statute."6 Legislative rules, then, are uncontroversially "final agency action" that
may be judicially reviewed before ever being enforced against a regulated party.'
But promulgating a legislative rule is not always easy. The APA demands that
any binding legislative rule first be noticed to the public and subject to com-
ment.' This process of notice-and-comment rulemaking can be costly and time
consuming.9 As a result, agencies increasingly make policy through "guidance"
1. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
2. Id. 5 551(13).
3. See infra Part I.
4- 5 U.S.C. 5 551(4).
5. Id.
6. Nat'1 Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
7. See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F-3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
8. See 5 U.S.C. 5 5 53(b)-(c).
9. See, e.g., William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsive-
ness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 66, 69
(2004) (finding the average interval between the initiation of research for a policy and the
publication of a proposed rule implementing that policy to be 4.3 years; finding the average
length of the comment period to be 2.2 years).
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or "nonlegislative rules"'o that are exempted from notice-and-comment rule-
making." This Note addresses whether these nonlegislative rules, particularly
interpretative rules, are "final agency action" and therefore subject to pre-en-
forcement judicial review.
For a regulated party, obtaining judicial review of a nonlegislative rule before
it is enforced matters a great deal. Otherwise, that party faces the undesirable
choice of either complying with a dubious and possibly onerous policy or choos-
ing to violate the rule, take its chances in court, and risk sanction. Imagine a car
manufacturer. Suppose that the Clean Air Act (CAA) grants the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) authority to demand a recall when a substantial num-
ber of any class of vehicles do not conform to EPA emission standards "when in
actual use throughout their useful life."" Finally, suppose EPA issues an inter-
pretative rule stating that it interpreis that provision of the CAA to authorize
EPA to recall all members of a nonconforming class of vehicles, regardless of the
age or mileage of any given member.'3
The car manufacturer might find the interpretative rule legally dubious. If
EPA ever cites or relies upon that rule when recalling one of its vehicle classes,
the manufacturer would certainly be able to challenge it at that time. And if the
interpretative rule is a final agency action that leaves the manufacturer "adversely
affected or aggrieved,"" it could challenge the rule upon its issuance. However,
if the interpretative rule is not final agency action, the carmaker cannot challenge
it until it is applied. In many cases, the car manufacturer will simply comply with
the interpretative rule if it cannot challenge it when it is promulgated. As the
government has itself acknowledged, even agency guidance documents "can
1o. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes ofAdministrative Regulation,
52ADMIN.L. REV. 159, 168 (2000); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J.
1463, 1468-69 (1992); see also Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency
Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 785 (2010) ("Guidance documents greatly out-
number legislative rules . . .
n. 5 U.S.C. 5 553(d)(2).
12. This hypothetical is based on Section 207(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. 5 7541(c)(1)
(2012).
13. This is almost exactly the interpretative rule at issue in Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742
F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
14. 5 U.S.C. 5 702.
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have coercive effects or lead parties to alter their conduct."s The stakes of sorting
out finality for nonlegislative rules are therefore weighty."6
Under the Supreme Court's current approach, agency action is final only if it
is both "the 'consummation' of the agency's decision making process" and a de-
cision by which "'rights or obligations have been determined,' or from which
'legal consequences will flow."'" 7 Legislative rules mark the consummation of an
agency's decision-making process and have legal consequences because they are
legally binding. 1" Nonlegislative rules often mark the consummation of an
agency's decision-making process, so long as "no further administrative process"
is available to the challenging party. " But do nonlegislative rules determine
"rights or obligations?" Do "legal consequences" flow from their issuance?
This Note advances a historical answer to these questions. To be sure, the
modern administrative state scarcely resembles the fledgling bureaucracy that
prompted the APA's passage. But when the APA's text answers a given legal ques-
tion, that should be the end of the matter.2 0 And as the Court has recently reit-
is. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3435 (Jan. 25, 2007);
see also Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like - Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1328 (1992);
David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE
L.J. 276, 305 (2oo); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policy-
making, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 397, 407 (2007); A. Keith Lesar, Comment, Timing of Judicial
Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 56 CALiF. L. REv. 1491, 15oo-ol (1968).
16. Section 704 of the APA also requires that "final agency action" have "no other adequate remedy
in court." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (emphasis added). One cannot simply assert hat enforcement
proceedings are always "adequate" to remedy unlawful interpretative rules. See John F. Duffy,
Administrative Common Law in judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 178 (1998) ("[E]nforce-
ment proceedings can always provide an adequateforum for testing the validity of a regula-
tion-no one thinks that courts reviewing enforcement proceedings are incapable of enter-
taining and deciding the validity of a regulation -but the relevant issue is whether the court
at that later time will be capable of providing an adequate remedy, because the party may have
already suffered harm that cannot be corrected by the remedies (injunctive and declaratory)
then available."). The potentially coercive nature of some interpretative rules entails certain
harms that cannot be adequately remedied during enforcement proceedings.
17. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (first quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948); then quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass'n v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatl., 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
is. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979).
ig. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 612 Fed. App'x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
20. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015).
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erated, it generally interprets statutes according to the relevant words' contem-
poraneous meaning - that is, the meaning they bore when adopted by Congress
and the President.21 The APA is no exception.
The history of the APA, including commentary published before, during,
and shortly after its enactment, documents a consensus that interpretative rules
and policy statements did not "have the force and effect of law" - a conclusion
recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.22 Moreover, although few commen-
tators explicitly considered the availability of pre-enforcement judicial review for
interpretative rules and policy statements, those who did uniformly argued that
they could not be challenged prior to enforcement, largely because they did
nothing more than express an agency's interpretation of a statute - an interpre-
tation that could never bind the courts.2 3
While this historical understanding initially suggests that nonlegislative
rules do not "determine rights and obligations" or produce "legal consequences,"
it rests on a premise that is no longer true: that an agency's interpretation of a
statute could never bind the courts. Although judicial deference to administra-
tive interpretations of statutes certainly existed before the APA, 24 this notion of
deference was a far cry from the kind later adopted in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2s Under Chevron deference, courts facing
sufficiently ambiguous statutes must accept any reasonable agency statutory in-
terpretation that meets other threshold criteria.26
After Chevron, certain nonlegislative rules interpreting ambiguous statutory
provisions have the "force and effect of law" in that they are subject to the same
"reasonableness" standard of review governing legislative rules. Justice Scalia ex-
pressed the point best:
By supplementing the APA with judge-made doctrines of deference, we
have revolutionized the import of interpretive rules' exemption from no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking. Agencies may now use these rules not
just to advise the public, but also to bind them. After all, if an interpretive
21. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014); see also Perrin v. United States, 444
U.S. 37,42 (1979) ("[W]e look to the ordinary meaning of the term'bribery' at the time Con-
gress enacted the statute in 1961."). See generally ANTONIN ScADA & BRYANA. GARNER, READ-
ING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 78-92 (2012) (discussing the "fixed-meaning
canon").
22. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
25. See 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
26. See infra Section III.A.
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rule gets deference, the people are bound to obey it on pain of sanction,
no less surely than they are bound to obey substantive rules, which are
accorded similar deference. Interpretive rules that command deference do
have the force of law."
For better or worse, Chevron deference for interpretative rules is contrary to the
practice of judicial deference that existed when the APA was enacted.28 While
some have maintained that Chevron deference is also inconsistent with the APA
itself,29 this Note assumes that Chevron deference is neither precluded by the
APA nor likely to be judicially or legislatively abrogated in the near future.o
Assuming that Chevron remains the law, the goal of this Note is to square
Chevron and its progeny with the text of APA section 704. Harmonizing Chevron
and the principles underlying the APA's finality requirement yields a simple con-
clusion: those nonlegislative rules that are eligible to receive Chevron deference
have the "force and effect of law" and are therefore final agency action for which
litigants can seek pre-enforcement judicial review. While some courts of appeals
once recognized this link between judicial deference and finality, only one cir-
cuit - the Sixth- has maintained the connection.
27. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1221 (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("When courts give 'controlling weight' to an administrative
interpretation of a regulation- instead of to the best interpretation of it- they effectively give
the interpretation- and not the regulation- the force and effect of law.").
28. See infra notes 264-275 and accompanying text. See generally Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of
Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017) (establishing Chevron's
departure from the judiciary's traditional rules of statutory interpretation prior to the APA's
passage).
29. See, e.g., Bamzai, supra note 28, at looo (stating that Chevron deference "cannot be squared
with the text of section 706 of the APA"); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experi-
ment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 779, 788 (2010) ("The most startling thing about Chevron initially is that it appears in-
consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA") judicial review provisions.");
Duffy, supra note 16, at 189-211.
3o. If Chevron were to be abrogated or overruled, the following analysis would yield a much sim-
pler conclusion regarding the finality of interpretative rules. Assuming that interpretative
rules were only accorded interpretative weight commensurate to the interpretation's persua-
sive force, the generation that enacted the APA would not consider these rules eligible for pre-
enforcement review. See infra Section II.C. While this conclusion might be important in its
own right, it would yield zero practical guidance for agencies and regulated parties today, who
must operate in Chevron's shadow. Unless and until the sun sets on Chevron deference, parties
must cope with its existence.
31. See infra Section I.C. Moreover, Professor Hickman has briefly noticed that the concept of
"force of law" overlaps with the finality doctrine's concern for legal "rights and obligations."
Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REv. 465, 472-73 n.25 (2013).
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Following the Sixth Circuit's lead, this Note's approach to the finality doc-
trine has the advantage of reconciling finality's competing values of pragmatism
and predictability.12 Courts reviewing agency guidance should determine the
level of interpretative deference before determining the finality of the agency ac-
tion. Under such an approach, an agency is prevented from simultaneously ar-
guing that its interpretation is both nonfinal, and thus immune from pre-en-
forcement review, and entitled to Chevron deference if a regulated party
challenges it in a later litigation. Agencies would thus face a choice: either raise
the shield of nonfinality today and lose the possibility of enhanced deference to-
morrow, or accept that the nonlegislative rule is final agency action, seek Chevron
deference today, and sacrifice any delay of judicial review."
Part I of this Note canvasses the development of the Supreme Court's and
circuit courts' doctrine of administrative finality, particularly as it relates to non-
legislative rules. Part II then examines theories of administrative law prevalent
in the lead-up to the APA, as well as the circumstances surrounding the statute's
adoption and early implementation. This second Part ultimately concludes
that- consistent with Bennett v. Spear- legal effect was the critical determinant
of pre-enforcement judicial review. Moreover, interpretative rules categorically
lacked such legal effect because although they often received varying degrees of
deference in the courts, judges were always free to reject them in favor of their
own preferred reading of the statute. Finally, Part III explains how these histor-
ical understandings of reviewability, as applied to interpretative rules, must
adapt to account for Chevron deference. This final Part will also illustrate how a
post-Chevron approach to finality would operate in practice, applying the recon-
structed doctrine to prior cases.
1. THE CONFUSION WROUGHT BY BENNETT V. SPEAR AND ITS
PROGENY
The APA categorizes agency action as either rulemaking or adjudication." It
further subdivides rulemaking into three types: legislative rules, "interpretative
Nevertheless, Professor Hickman chose not to address this question in any detail. See id.
("Whether nonlegislative rules that are ineligible for Chevron deference ought nevertheless to
be justiciable as final agency action is a topic for another day.").
32. Cf. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016) (emphasizing prag-
matism); Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasizing
"clarity and predictability").
33. See infra Section III.B.
34. See 5 U.S.C. 5 551(5), (7), (12) (2012); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506
F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (distinguishing the two types of agency action).
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rules," and "general statements of policy."" The latter two are frequently in-
cluded under the umbrella of administrative guidance.3 6 Litigants challenging
agency guidance sometimes argue that purported interpretative rules or general
statements of policy are, in fact, legislative rules and should not have been prom-
ulgated without notice and comment." The categorization of agency policy
making is also relevant for issues of finality. Since legislative rules are virtually
always final and immediately reviewable," litigants seeking to challenge an
agency rule before it is enforced against them are inchntivized to characterize it
as legislative." Unfortunately, the tests and standards courts use to sort legisla-
tive from nonlegislative rules are confused and difficult to apply - they have been
described more than once as "enshrouded in considerable smog."40
Putting aside the lower courts' struggles to distinguish nonlegislative from
legislative rules, courts have more recently exhibited confusion in determining
the finality of concededly nonlegislative rules. Most notably, in a break from
longstanding judicial practice, a pair of recent opinions by the D.C. Circuit held
that virtually all bona fide interpretative rules and policy statements are not final
unless, and until, they are relied upon to support agency action in a particular
case."' In between these two precedents, though, another D.C. Circuit case en-
tertained the possibility in dictum that interpretative rules could be final agency
action prior to enforcement.42 This doctrinal whiplash indicates the underlying
conceptual confusion around finality. More importantly, it calls for a clarifying
test to ensure that nonlegislative agency action is subject to a coherent set of fi-
nality rules.
All told, the more recent trend to question the finality of all interpretative
rules and policy statements rests upon misunderstandings of the Supreme
Court's finality precedents. While the D.C. Circuit has attempted to clarify and
simplify the finality inquiry, its efforts obscure the Supreme Court's actual view
of finality, which is itself somewhat confusing. This Part concludes that neither
3S. See 5 U.S.C. SS 553(b)(3)(A).
36. Agencies also issue "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice," id., but these rules
are not at issue in this Note.
37. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
38. See, e.g., Nat' MiningAss'n, 758 F.3d at 251.
39. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat'1 Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 4 52 F-3d 7 9 8, 806 (D.C.
Cir. 20o6).
40. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1s65 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (quoting
Am. Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cit. 1980)).
41. See infra Section I.C.
42. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 758 F.3d at 251.
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the Supreme Court nor most of the courts of appeals have developed a coherent
approach to the finality of nonlegislative rules.
As a remedy to the Supreme Court's doctrinal inconsistencies and the result-
ing confusion in the lower courts, scholars and judges should return to the his-
tory of the APA in order to better understand how the generation adopting the
APA sought to balance the concerns of administrative flexibility and legal cer-
tainty that dominate the judicial discourse surrounding finality. More specifi-
cally, while some scholars think the APA's history discredits Bennett's test for fi-
nality," that history actually supports Bennett's test. And while the D.C. Circuit
increasingly maintains that nonlegislative rules can never satisfy Bennett, this
reading of Bennett is unjustified in light of the APA's history. These conclusions
yield a test for finality that retains the inquiry under Bennett (as applied to non-
legislative rules), while pragmatically recognizing the way in which nonlegisla-
tive rules can sometimes have meaningful legal consequences.
Section L.A introduces the Supreme Court's central precedent regarding ad-
ministrative finality, Bennett v. Spear. Section I.B discusses the Supreme Court's.
post-Bennett opinions addressing the finality of interpretative rules and policy
statements. Finally, Section I.C canvasses the various ways federal courts of ap-
peals have used the Bennett test to determine the finality of nonlegislative rules.
A. Bennett v. Spear: The Supreme Court Distills Finality to a Two-Prong Test
-Since 1997, Bennett v. Spear's' two-prong test has governed judicial deter-
minations of "final agency action" under section 704. But before 1997, the Su-
preme Court had offered little clear-cut guidance on how to evaluate whether
agency action was "final," rationalizing its somewhat unstructured precedents on
administrative finality as "pragmatic" and "flexible."4 5 In the 1980 case FTC v.
Standard Oil Co. of California (SOCAL), the Court constructed a multi-factor
balancing test for determining finality: (i) does the agency action represent a
"definitive" statement of the agency's position; (2) does the action have a direct
and immediate effect on the regulated party; (3) does the action have the status
of law, such that immediate compliance is expected; (4) is the question presented
by the challenge a legal issue fit for judicial resolution; and (5) would a pre-en-
forcement challenge speed enforcement of the relevant substantive statute?6
43. See infra Section II.A.
44. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). For Bennett's continued primacy, see U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813 (2016).
45. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1967).
46. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1980).
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Several of the factors the Court considered in SOCAL were seemingly de-
rived from the judge-made "ripeness" doctrine, rather than section 704's text.47
The ripeness doctrine counsels courts against "entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies," and is designed to "protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been for-
malized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." 4 Agency
rules are generally not "ripe" for judicial review until "the scope of the contro-
versy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual compo-
nents fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claim-
ant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him."' However,
legislative rules are ripe upon their promulgation because "as a practical matter"
they require a regulated party to "adjust his conduct immediately."so
Interpretative rules may be ripe depending on the circumstances of any given
case. Ripeness requires courts to evaluate two factors: (1) the "fitness of the is-
sues for judicial decision" and (2) "the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration."s" Issues are generally fit for judicial decision when the
agency action at issue is "final" under the APA and when the issues presented are
"purely legal."52 Bracketing for now the question of finality, the validity of an
interpretative rule can certainly pose a "purely legal" issue: whether an agency
properly construed whatever statutory provision is at issue." As for hardship to
the parties, interpretative rules often "raise ripeness concerns" because of ques-
tions regarding "the binding effect of the rule."" Therefore, " [o] nly the strong-
est showing of the immediate and inescapable effect of the mere announcement
of [an agency's] interpretation. . . would suffice" to justify pre-enforcement re-
view under the ripeness doctrine.5
47. See, e.g., Solar Turbines Inc.v. Seif, 879 F.2d bo73, io8o (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that SOCAL
"incorporated the ripeness standard into the standard for determining whether agency action
is final").
48. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148-49.
49. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
50. Id.
51. Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 8o8 (2003).
52. Id. at 812.
5. See, e.g., Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149; see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 736 F.2d 747,
749 (D.C. Cit. 1984) (stating that the "fitness of the issues" prong for ripeness is a "commonly-
met factor when administrators state their advice on what a statute means").
54. ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
5s. Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268,
1271 (D.C. Cit. 1974).
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However, part of the reluctance to find that interpretative rules pose the prac-
tical hardship sufficient for pre-enforcement review rests on the assumed dichot-
omy between the "binding" quality of legislative rules (that are always ripe prior
to their application against a party) and the nonbinding quality of interpretative
rules. That dichotomy is itself premised on the notion that some interpretative
rules' heightened deference does not imbue those rules with the force and effect
of law. As described in more detail below, that same distinction also undergirds
much of the hesitancy to characterize interpretative rules as "final agency ac-
tion."5 Thus, to the extent that courts grant deference to a given interpretative
rule, the ripeness doctrine should also account for this very real hardship on reg-
ulated entities. In other words, the analysis presented throughout this Note
counsels in favor of unifying finality and ripeness with respect to nonlegislative
rules. Thus, if a nonlegislative rule is sufficiently binding to be "final agency ac-
tion," the ripeness doctrine has no additional role to play."
Shortly after equating several ripeness-related factors with finality in
SOCAL, the Court began to simplify the finality inquiry. By 1983, the Court ar-
guably narrowed the multi-factor analysis of SOCAL by homing in on only two
considerations: (1) whether the agency action "represented a definitive state-
ment of [the agency's] position," and (2) whether the action was one "determin-
ing the rights and obligations of the parties."ss Seemingly taking the hint, some
56. See infra Section I.C.
57. In fact, perhaps the ripeness doctrine should have no role to play in APA cases whatsoever. As
Professor Duffy has argued, the ripeness doctrine "has no place in the APA.' Duffy, supra note
16, at 162. That said, to the extent ripeness persists in administrative-law doctrine, the Su-
preme Court has already recognized its impotency in denying pre-enforcement review to leg-
islative rules. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) ("[A] regulation is not
ordinarily considered the type of agency action 'ripe' for judicial review under the APA until
the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual
components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant's
situation in fashion that harms or threatens to harm him. (The major exception, of course, is
a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct im-
mediately. Such agency action is 'ripe' for review at once, whether or not explicit statutory
review apart from the APA is provided.)"). If interpretative rules eligible for Chevron deference
bind the courts just as much as legislative rules, then for all intents and purposes they require
a regulated party to "adjust his conduct immediately." If so, ripeness poses an equally minimal
barrier for pre-enforcement review of interpretative rules.
58. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 780 (1983); see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788,
797 (1992) ("The core question [under section 704] is whether the agency has completed its
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lower courts likewise began to focus on only these two factors.5 ' These post-
SOCAL developments set the stage for the Court's sharpening of the finality in-
quiry in Bennett v. Spear.
Bennett v. Spear made explicit the Supreme Court's shift away from the prag-
matic, multi-factor analysis in SOCAL. In its place, the Court adopted a nar-
rower, two-prong test for finality. The petitioners in Bennett, a group of ranch
operators and irrigation districts in Oregon, sued the Fish and Wildlife Service
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).60 Writing for a unanimous Court, Jus-
tice Scalia held that the Service's Biological Opinion was a "final agency action"
under section 704.61 According to the Court, "two conditions must be satisfied
for agency action to be 'final."'62 First, the action must "mark the 'consummation'
of the agency's decisionmaking process" -that is, it must not be of a "merely
tentative or interlocutory nature."63 And second, the action "must be one by
which 'rights or obligations have been determined,' or from which 'legal conse-
quences will flow."'64 The Biological Opinion was certainly the product of a com-
pleted agency process.6 5 Moreover, because the Opinion authorized the Bureau
of Reclamation to take the protected fish species "if (but only if) it complies with
the prescribed conditions," it "alter[ed] the legal regime" to which the Bureau
was subject, and therefore had "direct and appreciable legal consequences."6 6
While the Bennett Court's reformulation of finality narrowed the inquiry
compared to the Court's older, less structured precedents, that "does not mean
that Bennett's test is easy to apply."67 For some forms of agency action, the Bennett
analysis is rather straightforward. For example, a legislative rule, promulgated
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking and putatively binding on both
s9. See, e.g., G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co. v. Hawman, 870 F.2d 77, 8o (2d Cir. 1989); Dow
Chem. v. EPA, 832 F.2d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 1987); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 437
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
6o. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 159 (1997).
61. See id. at 178.
62. Id. at 177.
63. Id. at 177-78 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113
(1948)).
64. Id. at 178 (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass'n. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatl., 400
U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
65. See id. ("It is uncontested that the first requirement is met here .....
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value ofAmending the APA,
56 ADMIN. L. REv. 979, 987 (2004).
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the agency and the public constitutes final agency action under Bennett.68 And
coercive, noninterlocutory orders following formal adjudications likewise mark
the consummation of an agency's processes and determine legal rights and obli-
gations.69 But other forms of agency action, including interpretative rules and
statements of general policy, are not so easily classified." The Supreme Court's
treatment of these nonlegislative rules has been sparse, perfunctory, and confus-
ing.7
B. The Supreme Court Clarifies (or Muddles) the Application of Bennett to
Nonlegislative Rules
Since Bennett, the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the question of final-
ity, and its two most sustained discussions of the subject did not involve nonleg-
islative rules.7n But two other Supreme Court precedents since Bennett indicate
that the Court may be receptive to a flexible test for the finality of nonlegislative
rules. Indeed, both cases imply that the Court prizes other factors (such as addi-
tional procedural protections) aside from whether a rule is legally binding.
First, in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, the Court seemed to maintain
that a narrow subset of interpretative rules could be "final agency action."73
There, the Court held that an EPA interpretation of the CAA was "final agency
action" under the Act, whose finality requirement is the same as section 7o4's.
But the interpretation that the Court held to be final agency action did not take
the form of a relatively informal memorandum, notice letter, or guidance docu-
ment, which are the most frequent embodiments of an agency's nonlegislative
actions.7s Instead, EPA published it in the explanatory preamble accompanying
68. See, e.g., William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1321, 1335 (2001)
("If a rule is a legislative rule adopted after notice and comment, it is virtually without ques-
tion final agency action.").
69. See, e.g., Stephens Media, LLC v. NLRB, 677 F.3d 1241, 1249-50 (D.C. Cit. 2012) (holding that
a decision and order of the NLRB - adopted based on a prior hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge - was final under Bennett).
70. See, e.g., Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review ofAgency Guidance Documents: Rethinking the Fi-
nality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 389-98 (20o8).
i. See infra Section I.B.
72. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813-15 (2016); Sackett v. EPA,
566 U.S. 120, 126-27 (2012).
73. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
74 Id. at 478.
75. See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 893, 893 (2004).
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a final legislative rule that itself was the product of notice-and-comment rule-
making." The Court in Whitman thus emphasized that the agency had inter-
preted the CAA in light of the public comments it received following the notice
of proposed rulemaking.7 Moreover, the interpretation was prompted by a
White House directive, and EPA had "refused in subsequent rulemakings to re-
consider it, demonstrating that "EPA has rendered its last word on the matter."7
All of these statements indicate that the Whitman Court cared greatly about the
process leading to the adoption of the interpretation, consistent with the first
prong of the Bennett est. But there is little in the opinion demonstrating much
concern for Bennett's second condition for finality.79
The majority opinion in Whitman cited only the first prong of the Bennett
test and explained that because the preamble represented EPA's "last word" on
the matter, it satisfied Bennett.so The Whitman Court never explicitly discussed
Bennett's second prong. Whitman came closest to the second prong of the Bennett
test when it assessed the ripeness of the challenge.8 ' In discussing the potential
hardships to the parties under the preamble's interpretative rule, the Court
sought to differentiate the CAA's judicial review provision from section 704. Jus-
tice Scalia openly questioned whether the preamble interpretation's effect on the
state parties would "suffice in an ordinary case brought under the review provi-
sions of the APA," but remarked that the "special judicial-review provision" of
the CAA specifically provided for "preenforcement" review.82 Therefore, statutes
like the CAA "permit 'judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects
normally required for APA review are felt."'"
One could read Whitman as disposing of Bennett's second prong on the basis
of the CAA's unique preenforcement review provisions. But that explanation is
unsatisfying given the Court's own reasoning. First, Whitman never explicitly
discussed the CAA's independent judicial review provision in the context of fi-
nality and the required legal consequences, addressing it only in the context of
76. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 478.
77. Id. at 478-79.
78. Id. (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 586 (1980)).
79. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
8o. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 478.
81. See, e.g., McKee, supra note 70, at 374; see also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49
(1967) (discussing the rationales behind applying the ripeness doctrine to administrative ac-
tions). For a discussion of ripeness, see supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
82. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 479 (quoting Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737
(1998)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012) (special judicial-review provision).
83. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Lujan v. Nat'lWildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)).
2463
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ripeness and the required practical effects on the parties. Second, if the "special
judicial-review provision" of the CAA actually modified the meaning of the "final
action" provision in section 307(b) (1) of the CAA to include actions lacking the
"concrete effects normally required for APA review," then why would the Whit-
man Court confidently declare that section 307(b)(1) "bears the same mean-
ing ... that it does under the [APA] "?" Given Bennett's interpretation of 704 to
require concrete legal effects, and given Whitman's apparent conclusion that sec-
tion 3o7(b)(1) does not require such effects, it seems implausible to conclude
that the CAA's "final action" provision means the same thing as "final agency
action" in section 704.
Moreover, Whitman left ambiguous not only whether its finality analysis was
narrowly confined to the CAA and similar substantive statutes, but also whether
it was limited to the unique form of agency guidance at issue. Cases since Whit-
man have reiterated that while it is possible for preambles "in some unique cases
[to] constitute binding, final agency action ... this is not the norm."" Ulti-
mately, Whitman's import for the general reviewability of nonlegislative rules in
the form of freestanding guidance remains unclear. At the very least, however,
Whitman dispelled any notion that interpretative rules writ large are never final.
Shortly after Whitman, the Court again addressed the finality of nonlegisla-
tive rules in National Park Hospitality Ass'n (NPHA) v. Department of the Interior."
NPHA concerned a challenge to a National Park Service (NPS) regulation that
purported to exempt certain government contracts from the requirements of a
federal statute." The NPS had arrived at this interpretation of the relevant fed-
eral statute after engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking." However, the
NPHA Court held that because Congress had not delegated rulemaking author-
ity to the NPS in its substantive statute, the challenged interpretation could not
be "a legislative regulation with the force of law."89
The Court went on to explain that the agency action - once shorn of its leg-
islative character - did "not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from
doing anything"; did "not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license,
power or authority"; did "not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability";
84. Id. at 478-79.
85. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 559 F.3d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. EPA, 706 F.3d 428,432-34 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Whitman and adhering
to the norm against finding final agency action in preambles).
86. 538 U.S. 803 (2003).
87. Id. at 8o6.
88. Id.
8g. Id. at 8o8.
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and created "no legal rights or obligations."90 Nevertheless, the Court held that
the policy statement was "'final agency action' . .. within the meaning of" section
704 of the APA, even though it was ultimately unripe for review." Not once in
its analysis of finality did the NPHA court cite Bennett's requirements for finality.
Instead, the Court relied on Abbott Laboratories, the 1967 precedent whose "prag-
matic" and "flexible" characterization of finality92 appeared less tenable after
Bennett's concise, two-prong formulation.
NP-IA, like Whitman, stands in significant tension with Bennett.93 Unlike
Whitman, where the Court could perhaps rely on the "special judicial-review
provision" of the CAA, 94 the Court in NPHA had no analogous explanation for
its departure from the second prong of the Bennett est.
But as in Whitman, it is possible to limit NPHA to its facts. NPHA involved
a general statement of policy, but that nonlegislative rule was promulgated after
public notice and comment. While this fact might not excuse the Court from
entirely overlooking the Bennett est, it again demonstrates the apparent central-
ity of procedure, even if the consummation of that procedure yields only an in-
terpretative rule (Whitman) or policy statement (NPHA) lacking the force and
effect of law.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's limited precedents have left the courts of
appeals with guidance that is at best ambiguous, and sometimes confusing and
contradictory. The lower courts have coped with this doctrinal morass through
a variety of approaches, on a spectrum spanning from highly context-dependent
assessments of practical effects to the D.C. Circuit's recent bright-line rule sepa-
rating the reviewability of legislative rules from that of nonlegislative rules. In-
stead of following the Supreme Court's "pragmatic" application of Bennett,9 5 the
D.C. Circuit's emerging doctrine has taken a rather strict approach to Bennett's
second prong, and has seemingly rendered the entire category of nonlegislative
rules unreviewable prior to agency enforcement.
go. Id. (quoting Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998)).
gi. Id. at 812; see also id. at 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]s the majority concedes, the Park
Service's determination constitutes 'final agency action' within the meaning of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.").
92. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-150 (1967).
93. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass'n v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatl., 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
94. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
95. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016).
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C. The Courts ofAppeals Apply Bennett o Nonlegislative Rules
In the wake of Bennett, three broad approaches to the finality of nonlegisla-
tive rules have emerged in the circuit courts' treatment of inality for nonlegisla-
tive rules. One approach, emphasizing pragmatic effect, most frequently main-
tains that interpretative rules are final agency action. Under this approach, an
interpretative rule's practical effects and substantial impact on regulated parties
can be enough to meet Bennett's second prong. A second approach, focusing on
the need for agency action to carry the "force of law," rarely deems interpretative
rules to satisfy Bennett's test for finality. The D.C. Circuit has carried this second
approach toward a bright-line rule that would categorically preclude from pre-
enforcement review all interpretative rules and policy statements. A third ap-
proach, adopted by one circuit and echoed by two Justices, shares the second
view that "final agency action" must carry the "force of law." However, this ap-
proach also recognizes that heightened deference to an agency's interpretative
rule could imbue that rule with the "force of law." Ultimately, this Note concludes
that this third approach best implements the original meaning of APA section
704, even though its previous advocates have failed to offer a historical defense
of its correctness.
1. "The Pragmatic Approach." The Ninth Circuit has emphasized flexibility
and pragmatism in its finality doctrine.96 For example, in Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Veneman, it held that when an interpretative rule "has 'a substantial im-
pact on the rights of individuals[,]' its promulgation may constitute final agency
action for the purposes of judicial review,"" despite "lack[ing] formal status as
law."98 As long as the interpretative rule restricts the regulatory discretion of the
agency - such as by providing a safe harbor for regulated parties to avoid liabil-
ity- sufficient legal consequences flow from it to render it final agency action."
Another case, Oregon v. Ashcroft, held that interpretative rules can impose "obli-
gations and sanctions in the event of violation" and therefore warrant pre-en-
forcement judicial review.oo Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has stressed
96. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated on reh' en
banc, 4 90 F 3d 725 ( 9th Cir. 2007) (mem.).
97. Id. at 838-39 (quoting Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
g8. Id. at 838.
g. See id. at 840.
lo0. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120 ( 9 th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA,
333 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9 th Cir. 2003)), aff'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (20o6);
see also id. at 1147-48 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (explaining that the final agency action require-
ment is met if the interpretation "significantly and immediately alters the legal landscape" and
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the need for a "'flexible' and 'pragmatic' approach to assessing the finality of
agency action."o0 Thus, when an agency "commit[s] itself to applying" a guid-
ance document "when conducting enforcement and referral actions," the result-
ing safe harbors for regulated parties meet Bennett's standard of "legal conse-
quences."10
2. "The Rigid Approach." The Fourth Circuit has hewed closely to a restric-
tive reading of Bennett's second prong and held that "agency action producing
only coercive pressures on third parties" was not reviewable final agency ac-
tion.103 Moreover, the court expressly refused to take a "pragmatic approach rec-
ognizing the [agency action's] powerful influence on other agencies and third
parties," concerned that "then almost any agency policy or publication issued by
the government would be subject to judicial review."o' Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit has held that the mere imposition of "additional administrative costs on
regulated parties" is insufficient to demonstrate final agency action."os Finality,
it held, requires the imposition of "new legal requirements on regulated parties,"
and that the agency action must appreciably "alter ... the legal regime to which"
those parties are subject.106
While the D.C. Circuit's approach has certainly evolved, it has eventually
come to embrace a categorical approach. To be sure, the D.C. Circuit's early prec-
edents seemed to support the pragmatic approach. For example, the Fifth Circuit
relied partially on a prior D.C. Circuit opinion when holding that even an
"oblig[atory]" guidance letter is not "final" when it has no practical effect on a
party's rights and obligations."07 The Ninth Circuit cited a different D.C. Circuit
requires "immediate compliance," even if its "concrete legal effects are contingent upon a fu-
ture event"). Although Judge Wallace dissented in the ultimate judgment of the case, he
agreed with the majority that the panel had authority to resolve the dispute, although the
issue was "given scant attention by the majority." Id. at 1146 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
101. Texas v. EEOC, 827 F.3d 372, 382 (5th Cit. 2016) (quoting Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781
(5th Cir. 2011)).
102. Id. at 381.
103. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852, 859 (4th Cit. 2002).
104. Id. at 86o-61.
1o. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 335 F.3d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
2003).
106. Id. at 619.
107. See Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 756 (5 th Cit. 2011) (citing Nat'l Ass'n
of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[I]f the practical effect of the
agency action is not a certain change in the legal obligations of a party, the action is non-final
for the purpose of judicial review.")).
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opinion for the proposition that whenever an interpretative rule has "a substan-
tial impact on the rights of individuals," it can constitute final agency action even
if not legally binding."os
Nevertheless, in three recent decisions, the D.C. Circuit has entrenched its
preference for a categorical distinction between the finality of legislative and
nonlegislative rules. A more thorough look at these precedents illustrates the
confusing effect that the Supreme Court's sparse finality doctrine has had on the
courts of appeals.
First, in 2013, the D.C. Circuit addressed the finality of nonlegislative rules
in American Tort Reform Ass'n v. OSHA. It held that an interpretative rule was not
final agency action under Bennett because it lacked the force of law.'09 The panel
cited just two authorities to support this view: a treatise on federal standards of
review authored by one of the members of the panel,1 o and a single Supreme
Court case, NPHA."' Because interpretative rules cannot "command anyone to
do anything or to refrain from doing anything," they do not create "adverse f-
fects of a strictly legal kind," and therefore "typically cannot result in justiciable
disputes."112 The panel concluded that nonlegislative rules "generally do not
qualify [as final agency action] because they are not 'finally determinative of the
issues or rights to which [they are] addressed.""'"
The following year, in National Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, the D.C. Circuit
was asked to determine the finality of an EPA "Final Guidance" document.1' In
dicta, National Mining Ass'n interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Whit-
man v. American Trucking Ass'ns"s to maintain that legislative rules and "some-
times even interpretative rules may be subject to pre-enforcement judicial review,
but general statements of policy are not."" 6 But Whitman- the lone Supreme
io8. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Am.
Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 56o (D.C. Cir. 1983)), vacated on reh'
en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9 th Cir. 2007) (mem.).
109. 738 F-3d 387 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
11o. See id. at 393, 395 (citing HAIRRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 157, 161-
62 (2d ed. 2013)).
ms. Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003). But see supra notes 86-92
and accompanying text (explaining that NPHA found an agency policy statement o be "final"
under section 704).
1n. Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, 738 F.3d at 393, 396 (quoting NPHA, 538 U.S. at 809).
113. Id. at 395 (quoting HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 157 (2d ed.
2013)).
114. Nat'1 Mining Ass'nv. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 246 (D.C. Cit. 2014).
115. 531 U.S. 457, 477-79 (2001).
116. Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 758 F.3d at 251 (emphasis added).
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Court case National MiningAss'n cited for this conclusion - is a curious choice to
prove that interpretative rules meet the finality requirements but general state-
ments of policy do not.117 Recall that Whitman never cited Bennett's second
prong, unjustifiably conflated finality under the APA with the CANs unique ju-
dicial-review provision, and even implied that perhaps only those agency inter-
pretations embedded in preambles to legislative rules were final agency action.
Given all of these quirks, the D.C. Circuit was perhaps too ambitious to declare,
without further analysis, that Whitman stood for the broad proposition that in-
terpretative rules might be final agency action. This dicta is particularly jarring
in light of the conflicting view of interpretative rules expressed by the circuit only
a year before in American Tort Reform Ass'n."'
While National Mining Ass'n suggested that some interpretative rules might
be final agency actions, the D.C. Circuit rebuked that dicta sub silentio only a
year later. In Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Huerta, petitioners
sought review of a Federal Aviation Administration guidance document related
to the stowage of portable electronic devices aboard commercial and other air-
craft."' Relying on the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Perez v. National Mort-
gage Bankers Ass'n, Huerta reiterated that interpretative rules, like policy state-
ments, "do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight
in the adjudicatory process."12 0 Ultimately, if a guidance document "reflects
nothing more than a statement of agency policy or an interpretive rule," it lacks
finality and may not be reviewed.12 1
Compared to American Tort Reform Ass'n, Huerta reflects a small but appre-
ciable evolution in the D.C. Circuit's approach. First, American Tort Reform Ass'n
only stated that interpretative rules and policy statements "typically cannot result
in justiciable disputes" and that they "generally do not qualify" as final agency
117. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
n8. National Mining Ass'n also agreed with American Tort Reform Ass'n that policy statements were
categorically not final agency action and cited NPHA to support this assertion. See Nat'l Min-
ingAss'n, 758 F.3d at 251. However, both American Tort Reform Ass'n and National MiningAss'n
erred in citing NPHA for this proposition because, as discussed above, there the Supreme
Court held that pre-enforcement review of the policy statement at issue was unavailable be-
cause the challenge would not have been ripe, not because the policy statement was not final
agency action. See Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003).
Therefore, even though National Mining Ass'n framed the issue presented as one of finality
under section 704 of the APA, it ultimately conflated that question with a ripeness analysis
that considers factors that are not necessarily part of the post-Bennett finality test (e.g.,
whether the question is purely legal and the costs of litigant compliance or defiance).
iig. See 785 F.3d 710, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
12o. Id. at 713 (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015)).
121. Id. at 717.
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actions.1 2 2 The analysis of finality in Huerta shed qualifiers like "typically" and
"generally" in favor of a categorical rule that also flies in the face of National Min-
ing Ass'n's more flexible dicta. And while Huerta cited National Mining Ass'n nine
times, nowhere did the panel confront this inconsistency.12 3
Moreover, Perez's resolution between American Tort Reform Ass'n and Huerta
seems to have bolstered the D.C. Circuit's interest in withdrawing interpretative
rules from the ambit of final agency action. In invalidating the D.C. Circuit's
one-bite doctrine,124 the Supreme Court held that genuinely interpretative rules
need not be promulgated through public notice and comment because unlike
legislative rules, they "do not have the force and effect of law." 125
However, Huerta is perhaps overzealous in reading Perez as categorically re-
jecting the finality of interpretative rules. First, Huerta's holding is difficult to
square with Whitman, where the Supreme Court did permit pre-enforcement
review of an agency interpretation that was never characterized as a legislative
rule. Huerta is also inconsistent with NPHA, where the Court held that the dis-
pute was not ripe for review but nevertheless conceded that the policy statement
at issue was a "final agency action."12 Second, if Perez had swept away Whitman
and NPHA, it likely would have done so explicitly. Moreover, Perez itself involved
a pre-enforcement challenge to an interpretative rule.127 It would be odd for the
Court to shut off pre-enforcement judicial review of interpretative rules by im-
plication in a case it resolved in that posture. Huerta probably overestimated Pe-
rez's effect on finality. Perez instead focused on a narrower procedural question -
whether interpretative rules ever require notice-and-comment rulemaking.
122. Am. Tort Reform Ass'n v. OSHA, 738 F.3d 387, 393, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
123. See Huerta, 785 F.3d at 713, 716, 718-19.
124. The D.C. Circuit's one-bite doctrine required agencies to engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking in order to change one of its interpretative rules. See, e.g., Alaska Prof'l Hunters
Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena
L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Perez resolved the longstanding controversy as to
whether that procedural requirement was inconsistent with the APA and the principles of
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
125. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 (2015) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979)); see also supra note 118.
126. Nat'l Parks Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003).
127. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1205 (explaining how the Mortgage Bankers Association filed a com-
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Whether or not Huerta reflected a permanent shift in the D.C. Circuit's final-
ity jurisprudence,128 it is an important precedent for the future reviewability of
nonlegislative rules.12' At the very least, Huerta demonstrates that the D.C. Cir-
cuit seems to be moving away from the pragmatic and flexible approach that
characterized both its own precedents and the principles expressed by the Su-
preme Court in Whitman and NPIA. More troublingly, the D.C. Circuit's path
to this result has been paved with misreadings and oversimplifications of prior
decisions. And perhaps most worrisome, Huerta's errors produced an unfounded
categorical rule that would completely preclude pre-enforcement judicial review
of even those interpretative rules that practically bind a reviewing court.
3. "The Deference-Is-Legal-Consequence Approach." Standing apart from
both the practical-effect and categorical camps is the Sixth Circuit, whose ap-
proach to finality addresses a different kind of "legal consequence": the effect of
judicial deference on the status of agency interpretations.130 Two opinions have
sketched out this unique approach. First, in Franklin Federal Savings Bank v. Di-
rector, Office of Thrift Supervision, the agency claimed that one of its bulletins was
both unreviewable because it was not final and entitled to heightened deference
under Chevron.1 ' The Sixth Circuit refused to allow the agency to have it both
ways: "When an agency has acted so definitively that its actions are defended
based on Chevron, we believe that its action should be treated as final."1 32 More
than a decade later in Air Brake Systems, Inc. v. Mineta, the Sixth Circuit elabo-
rated upon Franklin, holding that, because agency interpretations eligible for
128. For what it's worth, at least two subsequent panels have implicitly rejected Huerta's categorical
rule, though they did not acknowledge Huerta at all. See Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of
Transp., 836 F-3d 4 2, 56 (D.C. Cit. 2016); Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 612 Fed.
App'x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
129. But see Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption 70 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-04-05, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2958267
[http://perma.cc/3R89-FU79] ("To proclaim that the [Huerta] court's fusion of the two lines
of precedents [concerning interpretative rules and policy statements] necessarily represents
the wave of the future would be premature.").
130. Long before its decisions in American Tort Reform Ass'n and Huerta, the D.C. Circuit advanced
this same approach, concluding that an EPA interpretative rule was "final agency action" in
part because it had "legal effect" stemming from the deference commanded by "an authorita-
tive interpretation of an executive official." Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 8o F.2d 430, 437 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (quoting Nat'l Auto. Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 697
(D.C. Cir. 1971)). A year after Ciba-Geigy, another D.C. Circuit panel expressed the view that
even under Chevron deference an interpretative rule could not bind the courts, and held an
interpretative rule unripe for review. See Nat'l Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 790
(D.C. Cir. 1987). The panel left ambiguous whether the agency action was also not "final."
131. 927 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1991).
132. Id.
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Chevron have "binding effect" on the courts, "legal consequences" flow suffi-
ciently to satisfy the second prong of Bennett. "' However, the Air Brake Systems
panel refused to grant that the less potent "Skidmore respect" that any agency
interpretation receives results in the kind of "legal consequence" sufficient to
make that agency interpretation "final for purposes of direct review."134
While no other circuit has adopted the Sixth Circuit's approach, two Justices
have seemed to echo the importance of interpretative deference when assessing
"legal consequence" under Bennett. In Perez, Justices Scalia and Thomas, each
separately concurring in the judgment, argued that the majority wrongly dis-
counted the degree to which agency interpretations often "do have the force of
law," at least under the Seminole Rock-Auer deference regime.13 1 As Justice Scalia
put the point, "Interpretive rules that command deference do have the force of
law."136 However, like the Sixth Circuit before them, neither Justice Scalia nor
Justice Thomas attempted to support their intuitions beyond mere assertion. For
example, how much deference is needed to approach the "force of law"? Appar-
ently, Justices Scalia and Thomas thought Seminole Rock-Auer deference did the
trick. But what about Chevron deference? Skidmore deference? More importantly,
what basis did either the Sixth Circuit or Justices Scalia and Thomas have for
concluding that judicial deference is relevant at all in determining whether
agency action carries the "force of law"? Indeed, one wonders why Justices Scalia
and Thomas - two of the Roberts Court's most historically minded jurists -
never appealed to the APA's history to support their theory that enough inter-
pretive deference could give an interpretative rule the force of law.
Given the obvious confusion in modern judicial attempts to determine ad-
ministrative finality, this Note advocates for a return to the historical origins of
the APA. While history sometimes obscures, the benefits of a historical approach
in this instance are clear. A careful examination of historical sources yields a
133. 357 F.3d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
134. Id. at 643.
135. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); see id. at 1221 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("When courts give 'control-
ling weight' to an administrative interpretation of a regulation -instead of to the best inter-
pretation of it- they effectively give the interpretation- and not the regulation- the force and
effect of law. To regulated parties, the new interpretation might as well be a new regulation.");
see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (treating an agency's own interpretation of
its regulations as controlling unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion" (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989))).
136. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
137. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism in Practice, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1945, 1945 (2017) (describing Justices Scalia and Thomas as the two leading
judicial practitioners of originalism in their era).
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widespread understanding of the APA that enshrines the goals of both predicta-
bility' 38 and pragmatic flexibility."' This historically informed understanding of
the APA reveals that legal consequences ought to play a central role in finality
analysis. However, courts reviewing nonlegislative rules cannot simultaneously
blind themselves to an important practical reality of the modern administrative
state: the role of Chevron deference in shifting interpretative authority from
judges to agencies. A proper accounting of Chevron in finality doctrine respects
138. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("An important contin-
uing project for the Executive Branch, the courts, the administrative law bar, and the legal
academy-and perhaps for Congress -will be to get the law [concerning nonlegislative rules]
into . . . a place of clarity and predictability.").
139. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016) (describing the
Court's longstanding approach to finality as "pragmatic"). For what it's worth, the Court's
recent emphasis on pragmatism in section 704 cases is somewhat anomalous. For example,
Hawkes cited two cases to support its pragmatic approach. The first, Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), indeed advocated for a "pragmatic" and "flexible" approach to
finality. Id. at 149-50. However, the central case it discussed, Columbia Broadcasting System v.
United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), only found certain Federal Communications Commission
regulations to be reviewable prior to enforcement because they had "the force of law." Id. at
418. This focus on the "force of law" seems far more hospitable to bright-line rules than multi-
factor, all-things-considered balancing tests. Both Hawkes and Abbott Laboratories also empha-
sized the Court's opinion in Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956). See Hawkes,
136 S. Ct. at 1815; Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 15o. In Frozen Food Express, the Court held that
although the Interstate Commerce Commission "had no authority except to give notice of
how the Commission interpreted" a relevant statute, Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 15o. One of its
orders was nevertheless immediately reviewable because it "warns every carrier" acting incon-
sistently with the order that it "does so at the risk of incurring criminal penalties" in a future
enforcement action. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. at 44.
Hawkes's appeal to Frozen Food Express is curious for several reasons. First, Frozen Food
Express did not explicitly concern the definition of "final agency action" in section 704. The
lower court had found that the Commission's report and decision was not reviewable under
the APA because it was "not an 'order' subject to judicial review under" the statute. Frozen
Food Express v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 374, 378 (S.D. Tex- 1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Commission's action was an "order" within
the meaning of the APA, Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. at 44, but the question of finality was
never actively litigated in the case, see id. at 44-45 (stating that the Commission "argued for
finality of the order" rather than against it). Second, nowhere in Hawkes did the Court attempt
to square Frozen Food Express with Bennett's focus on legal consequences. The Court seemed to
imply that whenever an agency action warns a regulated party that its continued behavior
carries a "risk of significant criminal and civil penalties:' that would support a finding of final
agency action. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1815. However, it is far from self-evident that Bennett
sweeps so broadly as to embrace as final any agency action that merely causes regulated parties
to "fear" that the action "will increase their vulnerability to liability." Flue-Cured Tobacco
Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852, 861 (4 th Cit. 2002). While I take the Court's
continued interest in pragmatic flexibility as a given, I question whether that interest has his-
torical justification.
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Bennett's need for legal consequences while recognizing the practical reality that
legal consequences can flow from Chevron's theory of "delegation by ambigu-
ity."140
II. BACK TO BASICS: RETURNING TO THE HISTORICAL APA
While the Supreme Court likely thought it had reduced its finality prece-
dents into a clear and administrable two-prong test in Bennett,141 it most cer-
tainly did not, at least with respect to nonlegislative rules. Whitman and NPHA
exemplify the Court's own uncertainties in applying that test to nonlegislative
rules.'14 While the Bennett test has proven to be the Supreme Court's guiding
light in its two most recent finality decisions,'43 neither of those decisions in-
volved nonlegislative rules. The Supreme Court's inconsistent application of the
finality doctrine since Bennett has only exacerbated the D.C. Circuit's struggle to
interpret and reconcile those precedents.
This Part considers a variety of preexisting, contemporaneous, or near-con-
temporaneous sources-including cases, legislative history, treatises, and aca-
demic articles - to determine how an earlier generation of lawmakers and prac-
titioners would have understood the APA's finality requirement as applied to
nonlegislative rules. No single source is dispositive, and few conclusions can be
drawn with certainty, but the most important takeaway is that while Huerta and
the Supreme Court in Perez were correct that nonlegislative rules were widely
recognized not to carry the force. and effect of law, and were consequently unre-
viewable prior to application, that conclusion hinged on an important assump-
tion: that courts decided what the statute being interpreted meant, and that in-
terpretative regulations had no binding legal effect. Of course, after Chevron, this
principle of independent judicial interpretation no longer applies in every case.
Part III will analyze how to apply section 704's historical understanding in light
of Chevron's continued effect on judicial deference.
Section II.A justifies a historical approach to the APA's finality requirement.
In particular, a historical approach is consistent with prior attempts to construct
the finality doctrine and would tap into wisdom gleaned during the extensive
deliberation the question received in the early 1900s. Section II.B evaluates the
140. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("Sometimes
the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit, rather than explicit.
In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
141. See, e.g., Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813.
142. See supra Section I.B.
143. See Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813-15; Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 126-27 (2012).
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criteria courts developed shortly before and after the APA's enactment for decid-
ing whether a given agency action was reviewable prior to enforcement. This
history demonstrates that Bennett's legal-consequences prong rests on solid his-
torical footing: agency actions without legal effect were unreviewable before
their application. But what about interpretative rules? Did they possess the kind
of legal effect necessary to warrant pre-enforcement review? In a word, no. Sec-
tion II.C confirms Perez's conclusion: interpretative rules did not carry the force
and effect of law, even though they were accorded various degrees of deference.
Nevertheless, the regime of deference for interpretative rules existing prior to the
APA never went so far as modern-day Chevron deference. At the end of the day,
courts retained discretion to reject an agency's interpretation of a statute, so long
as the court came to a different view on the merits. That shift necessitates a cor-
responding alteration of the APA's finality regime that respects the importance
of Chevron in the administrative landscape. In particular, Part III will build off of
the Sixth Circuit's approach discussed in Part I and will attempt to unify the
Chevron eligibility and finality inquiries. In reconciling the historical APA with
the contemporary doctrine surrounding Chevron, Part III then calls for courts
determine the degree of deference applicable to the agency interpretation before
determining finality.
A. Justifying a Historical Interpretation of the APA
Scholars and commentators continue to debate whether the APA's judicial
review provisions were designed to merely codify existing administrative com-
mon law or to stake out new ground in administrative procedure.144 But when
the APA's failure to define a term like "final agency action" has bedeviled the
federal courts, looking to the administrative common law preceding the APA is
a useful - and heretofore underutilized - method of interpretation. As the Su-
preme Court stated long ago inAldridge v. Williams, when a statute is sufficiently
ambiguous, the courts must "look[], if necessary, to the public history of the
times in which it was passed." 14s Likewise, as Justice Frankfurter wrote,
"[w] ords must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who framed
them."146
To be sure, the historical understanding of "final agency action" need not be
the only basis on which one might evaluate either the propriety of Bennett's sec-
ond prong or the correctness of Huerta's doctrinal innovation. Perhaps the APA's
144. See sources cited infra note 161 and accompanying text.
145. 4 4 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845).
146. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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status as a transsubstantive statute designed to regulate constantly evolving ad-
ministrative agencies justifies a dynamic approach to interpretation.
However, this argument is unjustified for at least two reasons. First, the ar-
guably "dynamic" interpretations offered by the Supreme Court and the circuits
have produced finality's existing doctrinal confusion. Second, much of the exist-
ing academic debate surrounding the finality of nonlegislative rules has already
taken place on the field of history. In particular, Bennett's second prong - requir-
ing final agency action to determine legal rights and obligations or to produce
legal consequences - has been the subject of sustained historical criticism. Much
of this criticism is centered on the concern that Bennett's second prong represents
a departure from historical understandings of finality.147 For example, Gwendo-
lyn McKee has attempted to bury Bennett's second prong by reference to the
APA's legislative history and the cases prefacing Bennett. 18 McKee's treatment of
the historical propriety of Bennett is likely the most thorough in the literature.
McKee's attempt to discredit Bennett's second prong on the basis of the APA's
history falls short. McKee argued'4 9 that Bennett wrongly quoted Port of Boston
Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic' and two of its prede-
cessor cases'"' for the proposition that a final agency action must be one by
which "rights or obligations have been determined" or from which "legal con-
sequences will flow."' 52 But as McKee rightly noted, one of those predecessor
cases, Atlantic Coast Line, involved an interpretation of the Administrative Orders
147. See McKee, supra note 70, at 406 ("To bring judicial review under the APA back in line with
the APA itself, courts should limit the test for finality to only the first prong of Bennett, which
asks whether the agency action being challenged is final."); see also Brief for the Cato Institute
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at i, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co.,
136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) (No. 15-290) ("This Court should abandon the second prong of the
Bennett finality analysis."); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of
Guidance Documents, go TEX. L. REV. 331, 379 (2011) ("There are serious questions as to
whether th[e second] prong [of Bennett] really should be part of determining finality of a rule
under the APA."); cf. William Funk, Make My Day! Dirty Harry and Final Agency Action, 46
ENvTL. L. 313, 318 (2016) (criticizing Bennett's reliance on and interpretation of the preexisting
case law it cited to support its second prong).
148. See McKee, supra note 70, at 403-04.
149. See id.
150. 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970).
151. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 383 U.S. 576 (1966); Roch-
ester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
152. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Port ofBos., 400 U.S. at 71 (1970)).
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Review Act (the Hobbs Act),153 not section 704 of the APA. s' The Hobbs Act
speaks only of "final orders" made by certain agencies.'5 The APA, however,
speaks not only of "orders" but also of "rules" and explicitly defines each. 15
Therefore, McKee concluded that the legal-consequences requirement applied
only to orders and was never meant to apply to administrative rules or guidance
documents."5 ' Meanwhile, McKee brushed aside Rochester Telephone, the other
predecessor case to Port ofBoston - which implied that agency action constituting
an "abstract declaration regarding the status" of the company under the relevant
statute would be unreviewable'"- because that case was decided seven years
before the APA was adopted and also involved an administrative order, rather
than a rule.'
McKee's criticism of Bennett's second prong is less forceful than it might ap-
pear. First, while the distinction between "orders" and "rules" in the APA is
surely meaningful, section 704 permits review of "final agency action," a category
that includes both orders and rules.'6 0 While McKee is right that judicial prece-
dents interpreting the Hobbs Act were not directly relevant to the APA, she also
provides no evidence that the notion of "finality" as applied to orders under the
Hobbs Act should not likewise be applied to rules and other forms of agency
action under the APA. In fact, contemporary courts apply Bennett o Hobbs Act
cases in addition to APA cases.'61 At the very least, without examining how
courts reviewed rules at the time of the APA's passage, McKee cannot confidently
153. 28 U.S.C. 5 2342 (2012) (providing for judicial review of "all final orders" of certain enumer-
ated administrative agencies and "all rules, regulations, or final orders" of other specified
agencies).
154. See McKee, supra note 70, at 403. And while McKee did not mention it, Port of Boston also
involved an interpretation of the Hobbs Act. See Port ofBos., 400 U.S. at 70-71.
155. See 28 U.S.C. 5 2342.
156. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012) (defining a "rule" as "the whole or a part of an agency statement
of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy"); 5 U.S.C. 5 551(6) (defining an "order" as "the whole or a part of a
final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an
agency in a matter other than rule making").
157. See McKee, supra note 70, at 403.
is8. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939).
159. See McKee, supra note 70, at 403.
16o. See 5 U.S.C. 5 551(13) (defining "agency action" as "the whole or a part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act"); see also
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 845 (Carl McFarland & Arthur T. Vanderbilt
eds., 1947) ("The federal Administrative Procedure Act, however, does not distinguish be-
tween rule making and adjudication in its provisions for judicial review. . . .
161. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 358 F.3d 31, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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assert that a requirement of legal consequences could not apply to both orders
and rules. Moreover, simply because Rochester Telephone was decided less than a
decade before the APA does not negate its possible relevance. That Rochester Tel-
ephone was decided shortly before the APA means it is potentially useful in dis-
cerning the meaning of the statute that came after it. This is especially true if the
APA's judicial review provisions were truly designed merely to "restate" or "cod-
ify" existing administrative common law, as many have argued. 162
Having rebutted McKee's historical criticism, one can see how Bennett itself
attempted to center the current doctrine of finality around its interpretation of
the Court's longstanding precedents, indicating a desire to maintain continuity
with the Court's prior interpretations of the APA.163 While subsequent cases may
have departed from the historical understanding of the APA, none have done so
deliberately. In their efforts to faithfully apply Bennett, these courts have merely
overlooked- rather than consciously disregarded-the history informing the
test for finality established in Bennett. In none of the significant cases addressing
the finality of nonlegislative rules discussed above did any opinion reference, let
alone refute, the relevance of the history surrounding the APA, either with re-
spect to pre-enforcement review generally or interpretative rules specifically. Ra-
ther, it appears that the relative paucity of readily available historical research on
the subject, combined with the complacency of courts operating in a post-Ben-
nett world, seems to have resulted in the judiciary's present oversights.
More importantly, even if the APA were a "superstatute" ' establishing a
new and important institutional framework with a correspondingly broad effect
on federal law, its continued operation counsels against a broad or evolving in-
terpretative approach. Under the superstatute theory, "[t] he process by which a
162. Compare Duffy, supra note 16, at 131-38 (1998) (criticizing the "restatement" interpretation of
the APA's judicial review provisions), with JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNwIELDY AMERICAN
STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEw DEAL 76-86 (2012) (siding largely with
those arguing in favor of the restatement interpretation), Reginald Parker, The Administrative
Procedure Act: A Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581, 590 (1951) (explaining that the APA
"does no more than restate the wide and vague grounds upon which judicial review may be
sought"), and Alfred Long Scanlan, Judicial Review Under the Administrative ProcedureAct-In
Which Judicial OffspringReceive aCongressional Confirmation, 23 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 501, 509-
24 (1948).
163. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997); see also U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co.,
136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813 (2016) (explaining that the Bennett Court had "distilled from [the
Court's] precedents two conditions that generally must be satisfied for agency action to be
'final' under the APA").
164. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 5o DuKE L.J. 1215 (2001)
(elaborating the theory of superstatutes).
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statute becomes entrenched and that justifies evolutive interpretation of super-
statutes involves Congress, agencies, and the public coming to a consensus, not
simply the courts making pronouncements."6 s As Kathryn Kovacs has persua-
sively argued, because the APA is not administered by any single agency, the op-
portunity for deliberation and broad public consensus urrounding the meaning
of the APA is diminished.166 Therefore, courts interpreting the APA in a dynamic
manner lack the civic-republican pedigree that would otherwise exist when fol-
lowing the lead of an agency that administers a statutory scheme in a way that
interacts with and accounts for the public's changing concerns. Ultimately, she
concludes:
[G]iven the extraordinary legislative process that led to the APA's enact-
ment and the relative paucity of agency-based eliberative feedback since
then, courts should be particularly cautious about interpreting the APA's
text in a way that shifts the balance Congress reached through the polit-
ical process. Courts should look closely at the APA's individual provi-
sions, including Congress's treatment of each provision in the original
legislative process and the quality of deliberation the provision has seen
since enactment.167
16S. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207,
1240 (2015).
166. See id. at 1243. To be clear, the simple fact that a federal statute is jointly administered by more
than one agency does not mean that superstatute theory might not countenance an evolving
interpretative approach. For example, the Civil Rights Act and Sherman Act are jointly ad-
ministered by multiple agencies, and yet there are reasons to think that both might be super-
statutes for which an evolving interpretation is appropriate. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 164, at 1231-42. The APA, however, is applicable to nearly every single federal executive
institution and its purpose is procedural, not substantive. Unlike other putative superstatutes,
around which agencies can invest in and construct norms and institutions rooted in the sub-
stantive purposes of the statute, the APA is rather sterile. Moreover, because of the APA's
breadth, no agency can claim to possess a pedigree of experience or expertise giving rise to
meaningful deliberative feedback sufficient to prompt courts to accede to its view of the APA.
Finally, unlike substantive statutes, which often empower agencies just as much as they con-
strain them, the APA's procedural protections primarily constrain agencies' means for pursu-
ing their substantive goals. Thus, it is less likely that agencies possess the correct set of incen-
tives to deliberate on the APA's meaning without also systematically interpreting the statute
to support the aggrandizement of their own authority in the pursuit of their substantive mis-
sions. In other words, agency incentives align with substantive superstatutes because the
agency will often zealously pursue the power to which the substantive statute is directed. But
agency incentives for additional power will more likely misalign with the constraining telos of
the APA.
167. Kovacs, supra note 165, at 1254.
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The questionable quality of judicial deliberation over section 704, described in
Part I, combined with the public's lack of engagement with the provision, more
than justifies a return to Congress's original bargain- informed by relevant,
preexisting administrative common law-that can perhaps rescue the current
doctrine.
That being said, one potentially awkward feature of a historically grounded
understanding of section 704 could be the challenge of harmonizing that ap-
proach with the administrative common law that has developed since 1946, such
as Chevron deference.168 But common law is designed to fill gaps in statutory
texts created by legislative silence. "' If section 704 has a discoverable meaning -
one that reflects the "balance Congress reached through the political pro-
cess"170  that meaning must trump existing inconsistent administrative com-
mon law.
This Note assumes that Chevron is consistent with the APA,17 ' and allows
that section 704 may be agnostic regarding deference to agency interpretations
of law. The goal is therefore modest: given an existing body of administrative
common law that includes Chevron, how should interpreters apply the APA's fi-
nality requirement in section 704? The courts' existing interpretations of section
704 resemble a common law approach. Because they demonstrate manifest una-
wareness of the contemporaneous meaning of the term "final agency action,"
they appear to build a finality doctrine without genuine "guidance from any tex-
tual codification of law and policy."' 72
But the virtues of common law adjudication- coherence, increasing clarity,
and experiential wisdom -are largely absent from the confused state of the fi-
nality doctrine. Rather than plucking a reading of "final agency action" from a
range of potential meanings based on a policy preference, courts should begin to
give priority to the views of those who adopted the APA. That generation forth-
rightly confronted the then-minimal constraints on the administrative state and
weighed the optimal amount of power and constraint that would both permit
agencies to function effectively and allow aggrieved parties the opportunity to
protect their procedural rights in court. If the deliberations of the enacting Con-
168. See, e.g., id. at 1215.
16g. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003).
170. Kovacs, supra note 165, at 1211.
171. But see Bamzai, supra note 28, at 985-90 (2016) (describing Chevron's incompatibility with
APA section 706). This Note is focused on the meaning of section 704 of the APA. Whether
the present critics of Chevron deference are correct in their interpretations of APA section 706
and whether Chevron should thus be overruled are questions beyond the scope of this Note.
172. Duffy, supra note 16, at 115.
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gress did not yield a baseline understanding of "final agency action," then per-
haps the courts would be justified in filling in the interpretative gaps. But the
history suggests that section 704 embodied a cognizable set of standards to guide
courts in their interpretations of inality. Courts should abide by those bounda-
ries.
B. The Historical Availability of Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review and the
Centrality of Legal Effect
Having explained the aspirations of a historical approach to the APA's finality
requirement, I now turn to the first of two historical questions: In the era of the
APA's enactment, what features of agency action generally determined the avail-
ability of pre-enforcement judicial review? If Bennett's second prong is histori-
cally sound, then one would expect legal effect to play a central, if not dispositive,
role in that inquiry. And indeed, as I argue below, the history seems to bear that
conclusion out. Cases and commentary discussing the availability of judicial re-
view before and after the APA generally limited pre-enforcement review to only
those agency actions (usually orders) that fixed legal rights and obligations, akin
to Bennett's second prong. After establishing this point, the next Section takes up
whether interpretative rules possessed the legal effect necessary to warrant pre-
enforcement review.
The meaning of section 704's requirement of "final agency action" has long
proved elusive. One contemporaneous commentator, attempting to explain sec-
tion 704 to practitioners, admitted that the provision "reads like a product of a
semantic Alice-in-Wonderland world populated by legislative draftsmen and
German philosophers."1 7 1 Ouch. Nevertheless, afew clues can be discerned from
the text of section 704. In particular, while "final agency action" is never defined
in the APA, section 704 specifies that any "preliminary, procedural, or interme-
diate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on review
of the final agency action."1 74 Because section 704 expressly juxtaposes "prelimi-
nary, procedural, [and] intermediate" agency action against "final" agency ac-
tion, it is reasonable to conclude that "final" agency action cannot be preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate.17 s
173. Scanlan, supra note 162, at 519.
174- 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (emphasis added).
175. See Tom C. CLARK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 103 (1947). In the context of agency adjudications and coercive or-
ders, this reading of section 704 has generally been understood to at least impose an exhaus-
tion requirement. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: A HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
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But beyond this limited conclusion, section 704 raises far more questions
than it answers. Chief among them is whether, and how, the requirement for
finality applies to the availability of judicial review of administrative rules prior
to enforcement. While many contemporaneous commentators believed that sec-
tion 704 was simply a restatement of existing precedent,'7 6 one complication in
this view is that before the APA, most administrative agencies acted directly on
individuals through "orders" or "decisions" that were issued after proceedings
resembling either formal or informal adjudication.7' In addition, most avenues
to judicial review came through the agencies' organic statutes, some of which
provided for review of only "final" orders or decisions."' One such case involv-
ing the reviewability of an agency order was Rochester Telephone, the pre-APA
case that indirectly served as the foundation of Bennett's second prong.' This
predominant focus on administrative orders requires those interested in the fi-
nality of nonlegislative rules to analogize from cases that dealt primarily with
agency orders, as opposed to agency rules. As such, absent historical evidence
indicating a relevant distinction between agency orders and rules, this Note pro-
ceeds with the understanding that one can, and should, infer finality principles
applicable to agency rules from cases concerning agency orders.
More challengingly, even though courts today generally take for granted that
regulated parties can challenge legislative rules prior to enforcement,8 0 before
the adoption of the APA that was a disputed question. For example, the 1941
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure ex-
plained that until recently, administrative regulations had only been subject to
judicial review on collateral attack, "in actions brought to enforce them, in in-
PROCEDURE BEFORE FEDERAL AGENCIES 5 1939, at 127 (2d ed. 1946) [hereinafter ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE HANDBOOK].
176. See, e.g., 92 CONG. REC. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter) ("The provisions of this
[sub]section are technical but involve no departure from the usual and well understood rules
of procedure in this field."); CIARK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 175, at 1o1-o3; F.J. Mo-
reau, The Developments in Administrative Law Since 1941, 15 J. B. ASS'N ST. KAN. 1, 31 (1946);
Morton H. Wilner, Hearings and Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 18 PA.
B. Ass'N Q. 71, 81 (1946).
17. See, e.g., 1 F. TROWBRIDGE VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 175 (1942); see also AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE HANDBOOK, supra note 175, ¶ 1435, at 72 ("The ultimate and effec-
tive results of administrative adjudications are usually called 'orders,' which may be of various
kinds.").
178. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 16o(f) (2012); Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. 5 405(g) (2012); Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 3 5 5(f) (2012).
179. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939).
18o. See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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junction suits to prevent their enforcement, in declaratory judgment proceed-
ings, in habeas corpus actions to obtain release from arrests for violation, or in
private actions in which the results turned upon the effect of regulations.""s' The
Committee implicitly expressed a preference for rules challenges in the context
of "applying a regulation to a particular objector" because "[t]he decision
w[ould] be the kind courts are accustomed to render [ing]."
More overt in its distaste for pre-enforcement facial challenges of legislative
rules was the separate set of recommendations published by three members of
the Committee- Carl McFarland, Arthur Vanderbilt, and E. Blythe Stason.
McFarland, Vanderbilt, and Stason proposed a bill that provided that "any rule
may be judicially reviewed upon contest of its application to particular persons
or subjects.""' They argued that it was "unnecessary and unwise" for a general
administrative procedure statute to provide for judicial review of rules "in the
abstract."184 The proposed bill also provided for declaratory judgments, but even
then a rule would only be reviewable when it "interferes with or impairs, or
threatens to interfere with or impair" constitutional or statutory rights."8 s This
draft bill essentially sought to track existing case law requiring threat of "irrepa-
rable injury which is clear and imminent" to permit an action for an injunc-
tion. 1 6
However, by the time the APA was ultimately adopted in 1946, this stark
limitation on the review of agency rules and regulations was absent from the
statute's text, and pre-enforcement challenges to certain rules had gained wider
acceptance. Commentators recognized that because "binding [legislative] regu-
lations must be granted the status of statutes, their reviewability by the courts
follows the same principles which control the judicial reviewability of acts of the
181. ATTORNEY GEN. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 115(1941) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
182. Id.
183. Id. at 230.
184. Id. at 231.
185. Id. at 230.
186. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 593 (1946) (listing prior cases). Even
though declaratory judgment actions outside the field of administrative law would normally
not condition relief on a showing of imminent irreparable harm, the existing law in the ad-
ministrative context was different. As Professor Davis remarked shortly after the passage of
the APA, " [w]hen lack of threat of irreparable injury bars an injunction against administrative
action, lack of justiciable controversy bars a declaratory judgment." Kenneth Culp Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdic-
tion: 2, 28 TEX. L. REV. 376, 380 n.150 (1950) (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947)).
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Legislatures themselves.""' But only when regulations "directly affect rights al-
ready established" could reviewability obtain for the purpose of injunctive re-
lief.' 8 For example, in Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
Co., the Court explained that when Congress delegates a portion of its legislative
power to an administrative agency, and the agency acts in a "quasi-legislative"
manner, the agency action "is subject to the same tests as to its validity as would
be an act of Congress intended to accomplish the same purpose."'8 Regulations
are treated like statutes for the purpose of judicial review because they share fun-
damental, common features with ordinary exercises of Congress's legislative
power: they "grant rights, impose obligations, or produce other significant ef-
fects on private interests."'90 And because statutes that affect or threaten to affect
legal rights can be subject to pre-enforcement review, 9' it follows that "quasi-
legislative" substantive regulations may be as well.'
Legislative rules' capacity to affect rights and impose obligations was the fea-
ture that justified pre-enforcement review. For example, shortly before the adop-
tion of the APA, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, the Su-
preme Court confirmed that the legal effect of agency action dictated the
availability of pre-enforcement judicial review." The Federal Communications
187. ARTHUR LENHOFF, COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 759 (1949).
188. Id. at 759-60.
189. Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 388 (1932).
igo. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 986 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("When agencies are authorized to prescribe law
through substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation is not only due deference, but
is accorded 'legislative effect.' These regulations bind courts and officers of the federal gov-
ernment, may pre-empt state law, and grant rights to and impose obligations on the public.
In sum, they have the force of law." (internal citations and footnote omitted)).
191. See, e.g., REGINALD PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: A TEXT 239 (1952).
192. See Davis, supra note 186, at 383 ("From the standpoint of timing a challenge, regulations are
hardly distinguishable from statutes.").
193. 316 U.S. 407 (1942); see also Davis, supra note 186, at 384 (discussing Columbia Broadcasting).
A brief point of clarification: administrative law scholars writing in the wake of the APA's
passage often discussed the Urgent Deficiencies Act cases that follow in the context of "ripe-
ness" rather than finality. See Duffy, supra note 16, at 166-75 (summarizing and critiquing
Davis's and Professor Louis Jaffe's attempts to shoehorn these cases into the concept of "ripe-
ness"). I wholeheartedly agree with Professor Duffy that these cases do not appear relevant to
the judge-made, atextual ripeness doctrine; they rest instead on "traditional methods of stat-
utory interpretation -including attention to the text, structure and history of the Urgent De-
ficiencies Act." Id. at 169. Importantly, one must therefore ask whether and how the Urgent
Deficiencies Act's text aligns with section 704 of the APA. The Urgent Deficiencies Act per-
mitted suits to "enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission." Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 539. To what extent are
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Commission issued an order promulgating a regulation that prohibited the
granting of licenses to any broadcasting station entering into particular types of
contracts with any of its networks.'94 The Commission attempted to characterize
the regulations as mere policy statements19 5 and, therefore, the order promul-
gating them would be "no more subject to review than a press release similarly
announcing [the Commission's] policy."I 96 Columbia Broadcasting brought a
suit for an injunction under section 402(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,
which incorporated provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913 and per-
mitted suits to enjoin Commission "order[s]."197
The Court rebuked the Commission's characterization, holding that the pur-
ported policy statement was truly an order promulgating a legislative rule that
carried "the force of law" and acted to "affect or determine rights generally."'
The Court concluded by remarking upon the key distinguishing feature separat-
ing the Commission's reviewable regulations and the host of other agency ac-
tions that were traditionally unreviewable: "The ultimate test of reviewability
is ... [to be found] in the need of the review to protect from the irreparable in-
jury threatened .. . by administrative rulings which attach legal consequences to
cases under the Urgent Deficiencies Act permitting only review of "orders" carrying the force
of law probative of the APA's meaning? At first blush, the lack of the word "final" - assumed
to be the key modifier in section 704- indicates that these cases should carry very little weight
in understanding finality under the APA. But the Urgent Deficiencies Act's reference to "any
order" was implicitly understood to encompass only "final orders' " In fact, the "tendency of
the courts" had been to construe the Urgent Deficiencies Act's reference to "any order" as "al-
lowing review only of orders definitely settling controversies on the merits" -that is, final
orders. Note, Reviewability of "Negative" Administrative Orders, 53 HARv. L. REV. 98, 104
(1939). Thus, any such definitive order "that so affect[ed a] complainant's rights that he [was]
entitled to equitable relief could be construed as 'final' .... Id. (emphasis added). Even be-
yond the Urgent Deficiencies Act the phrase "any order" meant "any final order." See Note,
Appealability ofAdministrative Orders, 47 YALE L.J. 766, 773 n.38 (1938) ("Generally the phrases
'an order' and 'any order' have been interpreted as allowing appeals only from final orders.").
And orders were "final" to the extent they "affect[ed a] complainant's rights." In other words,
they were final if they determined rights and obligations or produced legal consequences, la
Bennett. In sum, even though the Urgent Deficiencies Act cases emphasizing legal effect did
not necessarily turn on the meaning of the word "final," they offer perhaps the best indication
we have of what defined "final orders" or "final agency action" before the adoption of the APA.
194. See Columbia Broadcasting, 316 U.S. at 408.
195. See id. at 411.
196. Id. at 422.
197. Id. at 408, 415-16.
198. Id. at 417-18.
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action. .. . "' Meanwhile, those agency actions that "do not adjudicate rights or
declare them legislatively" are thus not subject to judicial review.200
At most, Columbia Broadcasting simply reiterated the prevailing notion that
legal effect was a prerequisite for judicial review prior to the adoption of the APA.
For example, as far back as 1927, in United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Rail-
road Co., a unanimous Court held that a "final valuation" by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission could not be reviewed under the Urgent Deficiencies Act be-
cause it did not "command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing anything,"
and it did not grant or withhold any privilege or license, nor did it subject the
carrier to "any liability, civil or criminal."20 1 It did not "change the carrier's exist-
ing or future status or condition" nor did it "determine any right or obliga-
tion."202 Several other cases decided in the 1930s repeat these same ideas.203
Columbia Broadcasting thus clarified, shortly before the APA's adoption, that
the reviewability of agency actions generally depended on the effect of the action.
And while many commentators focused on the practical effects of nonlegislative
rules,204 the Supreme Court homed in specifically on the legal effect of the
agency action: whether it carried the "force of law," "affect[ed] or determine[d]
rights'" or attached "legal consequences" to private action.205 Of course, all of
this language is echoed in Bennett's second prong.206
Several commentators writing in the wake of the APA's passage asserted that
Columbia Broadcasting's requirement for legal effect was still applicable under the
new transsubstantive statute. Arthur Lenhoff remarked that the APA "did not
199. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
2oo. Id. at 424.
201. 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927).
202. Id. at 310.
203. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143-44 (1939) (holding reviewable
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act an order that was "not a mere abstract declaration" but
instead "necessarily and immediately carried direction of obedience to previously formulated
mandatory orders"); Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596, 599 (1938) (holding unre-
viewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act a report opining that a given carrier was subject
to the requirements of the Railway Labor Act because it "neither commands nor directs any-
thing to be done"); United States v. Atlanta, Birmingham & Coast R.R. Co., 282 U.S. 522, 527,
528 (1931) (holding unreviewable an agency "opinion as distinguished from a mandate" where
the agency seeks to "secure the desired action without issuing a command").
204. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE HANDBOOK, supra note 175, ¶ 1317, at 49-51; ROLAND
PENNOCK, ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 37 (1941); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, AMERI-
CAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34-35 (1950).
205. Columbia Broadcasting, 316 U.S. at 417.
206. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997).
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change the result" of Columbia Broadcasting.107 Bernard Schwartz also believed it
was "settled" that judicial review under the APA was "governed by the estab-
lished rule that only 'final' orders of administrative agencies which substantially
affect the rights of private parties are reviewable."208 And the Bureau of National
Affairs's summary and analysis of the APA stated that "final action within the
terms of this subsection [10(c)] includes any effective or operative agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court."' 09 Even the House
and Senate Committee reports both mentioned that section 704 encompassed
"effective" or "operative" agency action.2 10
Cases decided shortly after the APA's adoption confirmed the enduring sig-
nificance of Columbia Broadcasting. For example, in Eccles v. Peoples Bank, decided
in 1948, the Court declined to review a condition placed on banks seeking to
become members of the Federal Reserve System.2 1 ' The Court held that because
the bank sought relief for a legal injury that required the concurrence of several
contingent events, it was "too speculative to warrant anticipatory judicial deter-
minations."212 Justice Reed's dissent in Eccles, meanwhile, focused on the practi-
cal injury the bank faced by the condition placed on the bank's membership, in-
cluding threats to the marketability of the bank's stock and its ability to attract
customers.213 One can trace a through-line back from Bennett's second prong to
Eccles and Columbia Broadcasting for the proposition that the legal effects of an
agency action are determinative of whether pre-enforcement review is availa-
ble.2 14
207. LENHOFF, supra note 187, at 760.
20s. Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Finality and the Administrative Procedure Act, 37 GEO. L.J. 526,
527 (1949) (emphasis added).
209. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, ADMINISTRATIvE PROCEDURE ACT: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS BY THE
EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS 34 (1946) (emphasis added).
210. See H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 277 (1946); S. REP. No. 79-752, at 213 (1945).
211. 333 U.S. 426, 427-28 (1948).
212. Id. at 432.
213. See id. at 435-37 (Reed, J., dissenting).
214. It is worth mentioning that Eccles, like practically all cases from the era surrounding the APA,
is of only limited direct relevance. First, the bank sought a declaratory judgment and did not
sue under the APA. See id. at 427 (majority opinion). Therefore section 704 did not directly
apply. Nevertheless, several commentators recognized the relevance of Eccles to the APA's ju-
dicial review provisions, but they implicitly disagreed on whether the case informed section
704 or section 702, concerning the right of review for persons "suffering legal wrong" or "ad-
versely aggrieved or affected" by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute. Com-
pare Schwartz, supra note 208, at 528 ("Our analysis thus far indicates that it is only 'agency
action' within the meaning of section 2(g) of the A.P.A. that is subject to review under section
lo. Likewise,... the courts will not intervene where only preliminary or procedural orders of
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The most plausible inference from the preceding commentary and cases is
that nonadjudicatory agency decisions that came closest to exercises of delegated
"legislative power" were subject to the same pre-enforcement review as statutes.
However, the admittedly limited record does not speak directly to the question
of whether nonlegislative rules in particular were ever subject to pre-enforce-
ment review. The analysis that follows establishes the widespread belief that
nonlegislative rules did not carry the force and effect of law. That is, interpreta-
tive rules did not approach legislative power when the APA was enacted because
they were only ever conclusive on the courts by virtue of their reliability and per-
suasiveness.
C. The Historical Understanding of Nonlegislative Rules' Legal (Non)Effect
Recognizing the primacy of legal effect in securing pre-enforcement judicial
review, I now turn to nonlegislative rules (particularly of the interpretative vari-
ety), beginning approximately seven years before the APA's enactment. On Feb-
ruary 16, 1939, in response to a highly restrictive bill drafted by the American Bar
Association and introduced in the Senate,215 President Roosevelt asked Attorney
General Frank Murphy to form a committee to consider potential administrative
reforms and to propose legislation.2 16 The Attorney General's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure issued its final report to Congress almost two years later.
Most legal observers "applauded the research and recommendations" of the
Committee report.17 The report "refocused the debate about the deficiencies of
the administrative process," and even prompted the comparatively anti-admin-
istration American Bar Association to offer bills that moved toward the Commit-
tee's recommendations and ultimately "mirrored the consensus" of the Commit-
tee. 18 Given the practical significance of the Committee's report in shaping the
an agency are involved."), with Scanlan, supra note 162, at 513 ("It would appear ... that the
Supreme Court will not be predisposed to grant judicial review of administrative rules unless
the complainant can show that he is a person suffering a 'legal wrong."'). Of course, it is pos-
sible that Eccles was relevant to both APA provisions, because even if there technically can be
a legal wrong without "agency action;' see Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225, 227 (D.C.
Cit. 1948), the lack of final agency action indicates a strong likelihood that no legal wrong has
yet been suffered.
215. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: TheAdministrative Procedure Act Emerges from New
Deal Politics, go Nw. U. L. REv. 1557, 1594 (1996).
216. See id.
217. GRISINGER, supra note 162, at 72.
218. Id. at 73-74.
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public and political discourse surrounding administrative reform, a sound his-
torical analysis of the APA should include the Committee's recapitulation and
distillation of existing administrative common law.
The Committee recognized that Congress had conferred the power for some
agencies to "enact legally binding regulations"2 19 - that is, to enact legislative
rules. But all agencies, regardless of congressional authorization, could also issue
"interpretations, rulings, or opinions upon the laws they administer."220 These
interpretative regulations "are ordinarily of an advisory character, indicating
merely the agency's present belief concerning the meaning of applicable statu-
tory language."22 1 The Committee commented that some agencies promulgated
interpretative rules in the same form as other regulations "that have the force of
law."222 But while legislative rules were "legally binding" and had "statutory force
upon going into effect," interpretative rules lacked both qualities: "The statutes
themselves and not the regulations remain in theory the sole criterion of what the
law authorizes or compels and what it forbids."
However, the Committee's report also acknowledged that the neat line be-
tween legislative and interpretative rules was "blurred by the fact that the courts
pay great deference to the interpretative regulations of administrative agencies,
especially where these have been followed for a long time."224 The Committee
then quoted a 1930 Supreme Court opinion, which explained that "it is the set-
tled rule that the practical interpretation of an ambiguous or doubtful statute
that has been acted upon by officials charged with its administration will not be
disturbed except for weighty reasons."225 Because this doctrine "ha[d] sufficient
weight to give much finality to the interpretative regulations of administrative
agencies," the Committee acknowledged that the "procedures by which [inter-
pretative] regulations are prescribed become important to private interests."226
Even in this nascent administrative-law regime, commentators recognized both
219. FINAL REPORT, supra note 181, at 99.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 27.
222. Id. at ioo.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930)); see also id. at 27 (" [T]he agency's
interpretations are in any event of considerable importance[;] . . . even if they are challenged
in judicial proceedings, the courts will be influenced though not concluded by the adminis-
trative opinion.").
226. Id. at oo; see also id. at 27.
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the legal distinctions between legislative and interpretative rules and the practi-
cal challenges that judicial deference posed to maintaining the boundary be-
tween the two types of rule.
The Committee's summary of distinctions between legislative and nonlegis-
lative rules is instructive of the legal consensus at the time: legislative rules car-
ried the force and effect of law, but interpretative rules did not.2 27 Like the Com-
mittee, many commentators recognized the "blurring" between legislative rules
and some interpretative rules. They agreed that courts "looked differently at in-
terpretative rules than at substantive rules."228 These interpretations remained,
in theory, no more authoritative than any citizen's, but all recognized that they
were also accorded some weight in the courts.2 29 Nevertheless, as Senator Pat
McCarran, one of the APA's cosponsors, said on the Senate floor, compared to
legislative rules, "under present law interpretative rules, being merely adapta-
tions of interpretations of statutes, are subject to a more ample degree of judicial
review."23 o The Senate Judiciary Committee print of the APA agreed: "'[I] nter-
pretative' rules - as merely interpretations of statutory provisions - are subject
227. See, e.g., MILTON M. CARROW, THE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 32 & n.7 (1948);
JOHN PRESTON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES
137 (1927); JAMES HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 154 (1940); PENNOCK,
supra note 204, at 36-37; SCHWARTz, supra note 204, at 34-35 (1950); Ellsworth C. Alvord,
Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 252, 259-61 (1940); Cecil T.
Carr, Delegated Legislation in the United States, 25 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 3, 47, 50 (1943);
Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1940); Hans J. Mor-
genthau, Implied Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, 28 IOWA L. REV. 575, 582 (1943); J.
Hardy Patten, judicial Review of Treasury Regulations, 4 NAT'L INCOME TAX MAG. 373, 395
(1926); David Reich, Rule Making Under the Administrative Procedure Act, in THE FEDERALAD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 492, 516 (George Warren
ed., 1947); Stanley S. Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income,
Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 556, 558 (1940); see also Michael Asimow, Public Par-
ticipation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 541
(1977) (noting that the legal literature began to recognize the distinction between legislative
and interpretative rules in the late 1920S).
228. Reich, supra note 227, at 516.
229. See, e.g., HART, supra note 227, at 154; PENNOCK, supra note 204, at 37; SCHWARTz, supra note
204, at 35; Robert M. Blair-Smith, Forms of Administrative Interpretation Under the Securities
Laws, 26 IOWA L. REV. 241, 260 (1941); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in
the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470, 481-82 & n.53 (1950); Patten, supra note 227,
at 395; Paul R. Dean, Note, Rule Making: Some Definitions Under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 35 GEO. L.J. 491, 497 (1947).
230. 92 CONG. REC. 2155 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
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to plenary review, whereas 'substantive' rules involve a maximum of administra-
tive discretion."2 31
While some commentators confidently asserted that interpretative rules
"ha[d] no more the force and effect of law than the interpretation of a private
individual,"23 many more saw the shades of gray in the doctrinal landscape.2 33
Reginald Parker explained the problem by citing to two seemingly inconsistent
lines of cases. The first embodied the notion that "the construction of and inter-
pretation of a statute as applied to justiciable controversies is a judicial func-
tion."234 The second, however, afforded more deference to agency interpreta-
tions, claiming that agency regulations would be "sustained unless unreasonable
and plainly inconsistent with the ... statutes."235 Because of the courts' incon-
sistent treatment of interpretative rules based on the individual circumstances of
each case,2 36 Parker believed the truth was found in the "golden middle road":
agency interpretations were mere expert guidance whose weight varied with
their indicia ofreliability.23 7
While distinguishing between legislative rules and interpretative rules was
always a frustrating task for agency officials,; courts, and commentators,s the
"theoretical distinction" between the two was considered "indispensable to un-
derstanding administrative rules."2 39 Kenneth Culp Davis, a former staffer to the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure and one of the most
231. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE PRINT, JUNE 1945
(Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 11,
18 (1946).
232. Morgenthau, supra note 227, at 582; see also Alvord, supra note 227, at 261 ("In other words,
the Treasury's guess as to what the law means has no more legal effect than the taxpayer's.");
Patten, supra note 227, at 395 (" [S]ince the court is finally to decide the correct interpretation
to be applied to a substantive provision of a tax statute, it is erroneous to assume that inter-
pretative regulations have the 'force and effect of law."').
233. See, e.g., JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 50 (1925); SCHWARTZ, supra note 204, at 34.
234. Woods v. Benson Hotel Corp., 177 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cit. 1949); see REGINALD PARKER, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW: A TExT 199 n.59 (1952) (collecting cases).
235. Comm'r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); see PARKER, supra note 234, at 199
n.6o (collecting cases).
236. See, e.g., Note, Statutes - Construction-Effect Given to Practical Construction, 20 MINN. L. REV.
56, 61 (1936).
237. See PARKER, supra note 234, at 199-200 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
238. See, e.g., id. at 197; SCHWARTz, supra note 204, at 34; Reich, supra note 227, at 516.
239. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE
L.J. 919, 928, 934 (1948).
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influential administrative law scholars writing in the wake of the APA, 240 wrote
a series of law review articles that included a sophisticated and sustained focus
on interpretative rules. In particular, Davis's analysis usefully summarized the
existing doctrine and clarified how the interaction between interpretative rules
and "the force of law" was hardly simple.
In a 1948 article, Davis elaborated on the vexing problem of distinguishing
legislative from interpretative rules. While Davis seemingly accepted the core of
the force-of-law distinction,24 1 he likewise recognized that a categorical distinc-
tion was inaccurate, writing that legislative rules have the force of law and that
"interpretative rules sometimes do."24 2 The rigid dichotomy endorsed by so
many commentators sat uneasily with the equally widely understood notion that
courts always afforded some weight to interpretative rules. According to Davis,
the disconnect between these two views could be reconciled once one accepted
that the term "force of law" was a red herring: "A more significant inquiry is into
degrees of authoritative weight."243 Davis then distilled three factors of any
agency statutory interpretation that caused courts to grant them authoritative
weight approximating the force of law: (i) contemporaneous construction, (2)
longstanding practice, and (3) implied approval through congressional reenact-
244ment._
Davis's three factors were consistent with the long tradition of statutory in-
terpretation, 24 as well as the views of others writing in the years surrounding
the APA's enactment.2 46 His insight in connecting these factors to the legal au-
thority of interpretative rules was novel, although it seemingly made explicit the
only rationale that could reconcile the commonly recognized doctrinal tensions.
While not every commentator would have adopted Davis's sliding scale ap-
240. See Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 512 (1986).
241. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, De-
claring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 HARv. L. REV. 194, 229 (1949) ("The distinction be-
tween legislative and interpretative rules is necessary because only an agency having a power
to make legislative rules may issue a binding ruling, since interpretative rules normally bind
neither the agency nor the reviewing courts.").
242. Davis, supra note 239, at 934.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 936.
245. See generally Bamzai, supra note 28 (explaining the development and persistence of contem-
poraneous-and-customary-interpretation canons in the U.S. courts up through the adoption
of the APA).
246. See, e.g., WALTER GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 313 (1940); HART,
supra note 227, at 375.
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proach, many would have agreed that interpretative rules did not receive author-
itative weight in court merely because they were agency interpretations of ambig-
uous statutes.247 Moreover, as Davis acknowledged, even when agency interpre-
tations were contemporaneously made, were longstanding and uniform, or
preceded a reenactment, the courts still maintained discretion to reject them de-
pending on the courts' "views of the merits.""48 Even Davis's relatively nuanced
view offers only minimal guidance for deciding when and how to defer to an
agency's statutory interpretation.
Nevertheless, nearly all informed commentators of the time recognized that,
as a theoretical matter, interpretative rules did not have the force and effect of
law, despite the courts' practice of granting varying degrees of weight to those
interpretations. Even if the distinction between judicial deference and the "force
of law" seems tenuous today, as it did to some then,249 because the courts before
the APA were unwilling to cede complete interpretive power to agencies, it was
"necessary to draw a line somewhere."250 The prevailing consensus was that
whatever weight interpretative rules were granted under traditional judicial
practice, that weight did not rise to the level of the force and effect of law; the
distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules on the basis of legal
effect was correct and essential, no matter how challenging to administer.2 51
Combined with Section II.B's conclusion that courts permitted pre-enforce-
ment judicial review only when agency action had legal effect, this Section's his-
torical analysis suggests that because interpretative rules lacked legal effect- the
force and effect of law -they should not be subject to pre-enforcement review
under APA section 704.
While there exist only a few examples from that time period specifically ad-
dressing pre-enforcement judicial review of nonlegislative rules, they all point in
the same direction: nonlegislative rules were not subject to pre-enforcement re-
view. For example, in the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure's Final Report, the Committee remarked that interpretative rules "do not
247. This is not to say that there were not dissenters advocating for more radical forms of deference
to agency interpretations. Davis himself commented that one recent writer had forcefully ar-
gued that Treasury interpretations should prevail in court "in the absence of a clear showing
of error." Davis, supra note 239, at 935 (quoting Louis Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections
on Tax Administration, 58 HARv. L. REV. 477, 528 (1945)). But as Davis admitted, "[t]his prop-
osition probably does not yet embody existing practice . . . ." Id.
248. Id. at 958; see also ROBERT M. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YoRK 294-95 (1942); Lee, supra note 227, at 29; Morgenthau, supra note 227, at 599.
249. See, e.g., SCHWARTz, supra note 204, at 35.
250. See Reginald Parker, Administrative Interpretations, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 533, 535 (1951).
251. See A.H. Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1311, 1320 (1941).
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receive statutory force and their validity is subject to challenge in any court pro-
ceeding in which their application may be in question."252 Similarly, McFarland
and Vanderbilt's 1947 casebook on administrative law stated, "But even in the
case of a general 'interpretative' rule, a contest may be had only with reference to
the facts of a particular case or particular situation in which the private party
shows a legal interest sufficient to enable him to maintain proceedings."253
Jeter Ray, the Associate Solicitor of the Department of Labor, in a public fo-
rum at New York University in 1947, explained that section io(c) of the APA
(now section 704) raised the question of "whether advisory or interpretative
opinions, issued by the Department, are directly reviewable."a2 " Ray explained
to the audience that these interpretations "indicate merely the Department's pre-
sent belief concerning the meaning of applicable statutory language. They have
no force and effect of law and are not binding upon the courts although the Su-
preme Court has said they are entitled to great weight."255 But because these in-
terpretations "do not themselves create any rights or liabilities," they are not di-
rectly reviewable by the courts.256
Even Davis, the most adamant proponent of the idea that interpretative rules
could have the force and effect of law,5 seemingly admitted that they were not
subject to pre-enforcement review. Examining a set of 1949 regulations promul-
gated by the Federal Communications Commission, Davis explained that the
Commission had isclaimed that it was "promulgating rules which constitute an
exercise of delegated [lawmaking] authority" but was instead "issuing interpre-
tative rules for the purpose of stating its understanding of what Congress itself
has found to be contrary to the public interest."a Davis then conceded that if
they were merely "interpretative," the regulations "may well be immune from
challenge before they are applied in a particular case." 259 Moreover, Davis seemed to
also imply that even if the regulations were not interpretative, they still might be
252. FINAL REPORT, supra note 181, at ioo (emphasis added).
253. CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, supra note 16o, at 395.
254. Jeter S. Ray, Effect of the Administrative Procedure Act on the Regulatory Functions of the Depart-
ment of Labor, in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES, supra note 227, at 438, 459-60.
255. Id. at 460.
256. Id. (emphasis added).
257. See supra notes 239-244 and accompanying text.
258. Davis, supra note 186, at 387-88 (quoting i PIKE &FISCHER, RADIO REGULATION 91:234 (Henry
G. Fischer & JohnW. Willis eds., 1948)). See generally Note, Administrative Enforcement of the
Lottery Broadcast Provision, 58 YALE L.J. 1093 (1949) (discussing the legal issues surrounding
the Commission's regulations).
259. Davis, supra note 186, at 387-88 (emphasis added).
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unreviewable prior to application because they "have no regulatory [i.e., legal]
effect before that time."2 60
If one takes seriously the notion that the term "final agency action" in section
704 of the APA was a term of art designed largely to incorporate preexisting case
law on reviewability, the historical record yields a rather simple set of conclu-
sions. Only agency actions with concrete legal effects were reviewable. Legisla-
tive rules, because they carried the force and effect of law, could be subject to pre-
enforcement review because of their legal effects. Interpretative rules, policy
statements, and other forms of informal agency actions did not carry such legal
effects - despite the courts' widespread practice of granting agencies some meas-
ure of deference when interpreting statutes - and were therefore unreviewable
until applied.
III.INCORPORATING CHEVRON INTO FINALITY ANALYSIS: THE WHY
AND HOW
Returning to the current controversies facing the circuit courts, it would
seem that Huerta and the categorical approach has largely captured the perspec-
tive of the generation that enacted the APA. Moreover, the growing chorus of
critics of Bennett's second prong seems to have missed the mark. While the cur-
rent application of Bennett's second prong might be objectionable, the idea that
legal effect is essential to reviewability should be beyond dispute. Additionally,
the historical understanding of interpretative rules evinces clear support for Pe-
rez's conclusion that interpretative rules do not carry the force and effect of law.
Likewise, the history seems to support Huerta's position that because interpre-
tative rules lack the force and effect of law, they cannot be final agency action.
But neither Huerta nor Perez recognized a second feature of the history pre-
sented above - that the level of deference the courts afforded to interpretative
rules was both the subject of sustained scholarly and practical consideration, and
highly relevant to the question of whether interpretative rules carried the "force
and effect of law." And while the majority in Perez perfunctorily allayed the con-
cerns of Justices Scalia and Thomas regarding the role heightened deference
played in the "force of law" determination,2 6' administrative law scholars care-
fully considered this question and recognized the analytical problems it posed.
On the contrary, the history outlined above suggests that Justices Scalia and
Thomas were onto something in Perez and that the Sixth Circuit's "third-way"
260. Id. at 388 n.18o.
261. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 n.4 (2015) ("Even in cases where an
agency's interpretation receives Auer deference, however, it is the court that ultimately decides
whether a given regulation means what the agency says.").
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approach to the finality of interpretative rules also has a previously unrecognized
historical pedigree. Given the somewhat entative nature of this intuition, there
is thus far no precise framework for implementing this deference-dependent ap-
proach to finality.
This Part hopes to fill that gap. Section III.A discusses the uncertain applica-
bility of Chevron deference to interpretative rules. In particular, ever since a series
of Supreme Court decisions in the early 2000s, courts have struggled to deter-
mine whether and when informal agency interpretations are eligible for Chevron
deference. And the Court's recent decision in Perez poses additional conceptual
problems for interpreters attempting to understand Chevron's relationship with
interpretative rules. However, that Section ultimately concludes that Chevron el-
igibility (when obtained) goes hand-in-hand with finality under section 704.
Section III.B then explains the practical contours of the integrated deference-
dependent finality doctrine by applying its insights to a sample of prior cases.
Ultimately, this reformed doctrine yields a kind of estoppel: agencies facing pre-
enforcement challenges to interpretative rules may claim the mantle of nonfinal-
ity, so long as they are willing to forgo any future opportunity to claim Chevron
deference.
A. The Uncertain Effect of Chevron Deference on the Authority of (Some)
Interpretative Rules
Virtually all commentators writing before and shortly after the APA seemed
to agree with two propositions that arguably stood in tension. First, interpreta-
tive regulations and policy statements did not carry the force and effect of law.262
Second, agency interpretations were given varying weight by courts, and some-
times that weight was significant.2 63 However, at the end of the day, agency in-
terpretations of federal statutes before the APA were "only an extrinsic aid in
deciphering the meaning of an ambiguous statute."264
In Chevron265 the Supreme Court articulated the now well-known method
for incorporating agency interpretations into the construction of a statute. First,
the reviewing court, "employing traditional tools of statutory construction,'
262. See supra Section II.C.
263. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
264. Lee, supra note 227, at 29; see also Jacobus tenBroek, Interpretive Administrative Action and the
Lawmakers Will, 20 OR. L. REV. 206, 209-10 (1941) ("In its most common form, contempo-
raneous construction is resorted to as one among a number of extrinsic aids all tending to the
conclusion reached by the court, and is generally supplemented by a statement hat the prac-
tice thus commenced has been consistently and continuously followed.").
265. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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must determine whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue."26 If so, "that is the end of the matter" and the court "must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."2 67 But if "Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue" because "the statute is silent or
ambiguous," then the court only needs to determine "whether the agency's an-
swer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."268 In other words,
under a Chevron analysis "a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation" of an ambiguous statute by
the agency charged with its administration.2 69
Chevron displaced the more unstructured approach to judicial deference pre-
ceding it that is today often labeled Skidmore deference.270 First, the factors that
most often yielded deference when the APA was adopted- contemporaneous
and longstanding interpretations - are practically irrelevant under Chevron.271
Second, as Thomas Merrill described, Chevron created an "on/off switch" for
deference to agency interpretations; once the statute was deemed ambiguous,
any reasonable agency interpretation would control.2 72 Or, perhaps more accu-
rately, while the traditional deference regime embodied in Skidmore was a system
that gave agency interpretations various degrees of "weight," Chevron deference
opened up "space" for agencies to exercise additional discretion in the admin-
istration of statutes.2 73 In particular, under Chevron, once a court determines that
the interpretation of the statutes falls within "space" allocated to the agency, the
agency is "empowered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or con-
straints."
266. Id. at 842, 843 n.9.
267. Id. at 842-43.
268. Id. at 843.
269. Id. at 844.
270. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
271. In Chevron, the Court granted deference to an interpretation that was an admittedly "sharp
break with prior interpretations" by the agency. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862; see also Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 517
("[T]here is no longer any justification for giving 'special' deference to 'long-standing and
consistent' agency interpretations of law.").
272. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 977 (1992).
273. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let' Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore
Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Where Chevron applies, statutory ambiguities remain
ambiguities subject to the agency's ongoing clarification. They create a space, so to speak, for
the exercise of continuing agency discretion.").
274. Strauss, supra note 273, at 1145.
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Of course, one prominent ambiguity in the wake of Chevron involved
whether nonlegislative rules could receive such a strong degree of deference,
since Chevron itself involved a legislative rule.2 75 That ambiguity persisted until
a pair of decisions in 2000 and 2001. First, in Christensen v. Harris County, the
Court held that an opinion letter issued by the Acting Administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division of the Department of Labor was not entitled to Chevron def-
erence.16 The Court held that an interpretation in an opinion letter, "like inter-
pretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law," did not qualify for Chevron defer-
ence.277 Although Christensen seemed to imply that any agency interpretation
made outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking (or perhaps some form of ad-
judication) was precluded from receiving Chevron deference, the Court softened
its position only a year later in United States v. Mead Corp.2 78 In Mead, the Court
acknowledged that "express congressional authorizations to engage in the pro-
cess of rulemaking or [formal] adjudication" were generally "very good indica-
tor[s] of delegation meriting Chevron treatment."2' But Mead also acknowl-
edged that agency statements of law made outside the notice-and-comment
process could nevertheless receive Chevron deference so long as the Court was
otherwise satisfied that Congress intended for the agency interpretation at issue
to have the "force" or "effect" of law.280
Mead in turn introduced an unweighted, multifactor balancing test for de-
termining whether an agency interpretation made outside of notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking or formal adjudication could qualify for Chevron deference.28 1
Among Mead's factors are: whether the face of the relevant statute authorized the
agency to make the interpretation; whether the interpretation has precedential
effect; whether the agency action is subject to some kind of nonjudicial review;
the elaborateness of the procedures by which the agency produces the interpre-
275. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2093-
94 (1990).
276. 529 U.S. 576, 586-87 (2000).
277. Id. at 587.
278. 533 U.S. at 227-31.
279. Id. at 229.
28o. Id. at 221, 230-34.
281. Id. at 231-34.
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tation; how many different interpretations are issued; and the extent of decen-
tralization within the agency with respect to the processes for producing the in-
terpretation.282
Mead's emphasis on procedural elaborateness appears to align with the
Court's finality considerations in Whitman and NPIA. Recall that the Court in
both those cases found an interpretative rule (in Whitman) and a policy state-
ment (in NPHA) to be final agency action under section 704 or an analogous
finality provision without asking whether the rule at issue satisfied Bennett's sec-
ond prong. But both cases shared a common element: each involved a relatively
rare occasion in which an agency issued a nonlegislative rule according to the
notice-and-comment procedures that must preface a legislative rule. In other
words, the Court appeared to allow a nonlegislative rule's underlying procedure
to serve as a substitute for legislative legal effect, as required by Bennett. Mead,
282. See id. Mead's test was further refined and reinterpreted a year later in Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212 (2002). Like Mead, Barnhart offered up a multifactor balancing test, but its factors
differ from those emphasized in Mead. For example, Barnhart focuses on "the interstitial na-
ture of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question
to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful con-
sideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time." Id. at 222. But Barn-
hart continued to allow informal agency interpretations to receive Chevron deference in some
circumstances, see id. at 221-22, and arguably made it easier for agencies to claim deference for
their comparatively informal interpretations even relative to Mead, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chev-
ron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 217 (20o6) ("Barnhart's influence is already substantial, as a
number of lower courts have given Chevron deference to agency interpretations that are not a
product of any kind of formal process."). Mead and Barnhart have both been criticized as con-
fusing and inconsistently applied. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled
Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1443, 1448 (2005); Mark Seidenfeld, Chev-
ron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 273, 280 (2011); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:
Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 347, 347-49 (2003). And the Supreme Court itself
has sometimes ignored these tests altogether, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-69
(2006), or supplemented them with other novel barriers to Chevron deference, see King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,
2444 (2014); FDAv. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,159-60 (2000). Nev-
ertheless, these precedents remain the law. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290,
306 (2013); see also Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 564, 579-80 (D.C. Cir.
2016). That said, like Chevron, Mead and Barnhart might very well be mistaken. See Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. at 245-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Mead test as a "grab bag" of
factors and fearing that it will be "hard to know what the lower courts are to make of [Mead's]
guidance"). Again, the impropriety of various deference regimes (Chevron/Mead/Barnhart,
Seminole Rock/Auer, etc.) is outside the scope of this Note. My modest contribution is to pro-
vide guidance to courts and litigants in discerning administrative finality within the prevailing
deference regimes. While Mead andBarnhart are hardly clearer than the confused finality anal-
ysis plaguing the courts, assuming their persistence allows us to isolate and zero in on the
question of finality-an administrative law doctrine whose academic and judicial attention
pales in comparison to Chevron deference.
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for its part, likewise prioritizes the "fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking"
for Chevron eligibility. 283 While Mead likely assumed those "fruits" would
amount to legislative rules, it's possible to imagine a procedural continuity be-
tween Mead's test for Chevron and the Court's approach to finality in Whitman
and NPHA.
Nevertheless, I would not hang much analytical weight on this parallel.
Mead's overarching focus centered on one consideration: actual legal effect. As
Mead expressly held, "administrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress dele-
gated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority."284 Rather than aligning with Whitman's or NHPA's
exceptions to Bennett's framework, Mead maps more neatly with Bennett itself. If
all relevant factors indicate that Congress delegated an agency authority to make
interpretative rules with "the force of law" and the agency exercises that author-
ity, then surely the resulting interpretative rules determine rights and obligations
or entail legal consequences.285 Therefore, any interpretative rule passing Mead's
test should, in theory, uniformly pass Bennett's.
There is one obvious rebuttal to this line of reasoning: Didn't Perez expressly
decide that interpretative rules can never carry the force and effect of law? If so,
then how could an interpretative rule ever pass Mead's test? To be sure, Perez held
that interpretative rules categorically did not carry the force and effect of law.286
But again recall Justices Scalia's and Thomas's critiques of that portion of Perez:
the degree of deference courts afford to interpretative rules affects whether the
rule carries the force of law.287 The history canvassed in Section II.C seems to
support those critiques, rendering dubious the Perez majority's insensitivity to
the applicable deference regime.
Indeed, read only at face value, the Perez majority's analysis of interpretative
rules seems to eviscerate Mead, which seemingly contemplated that agency in-
terpretations could receive Chevron deference even if they are not the product of
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudications. To be sure, Mead's
283. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230.
284. Id. at 226-27.
285. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,178 (1997).
286. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).
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only cited example of an informal agency interpretation securing Chevron defer-
ence involved an informal adjudication, not an interpretative rule.288 It is thus
possible that Mead meant only to delineate Chevron's scope to include legislative
rules, formal adjudications, and some informal adjudications.2 "9 But later cases
reiterate that public notice and comment is not required for nonlegislative rules
to receive Chevron deference.2 9 0 Thus, to the extent Mead and its progeny permit
Chevron deference for certain interpretative rules that must -on Mead's own
terms - carry the force of law, they seem to directly conflict with Perez's categor-
ical admonition that interpretative rules never have the force of law.
It is possible that Perez partially abrogated Mead sub silentio, but I would
hesitate to jump to that conclusion. More probable is that Perez and Mead speak
past each other. In particular, I would surmise that Perez and Mead either have
different conceptions of what agency actions count as "interpretative rules" or
they have different ideas of what it means for agency action to carry the "force of
law." For example, if Perez simply equated carrying "the force of law" with "being
a legislative rule," then Perez and Mead could coexist because Mead never main-
tained that informal interpretations carrying the force of law were necessarily
identical to legislative rules. Likewise, Perez might have assumed that "interpre-
tative rules" are definitionally only a subset of informal agency interpretations
that would never pass Mead's test anyway. If so, then Perez would perhaps leave
open the possibility of other informal interpretations that are similar to interpre-
tative rules and yet somehow command Chevron deference. That said, neither of
these attempts to reconcile Perez and Mead are wholly satisfying; maybe that's an
indication that the Perez majority was wrong to conclude that interpretative rules
could never carry the force and effect of law, regardless of the degree of deference
afforded them. Or maybe it's a sign that Mead itself never meant to make inter-
pretative rules eligible for Chevron deference. Or, to the extent Mead intended to
include interpretative rules within Chevron's domain, perhaps Mead itself was
wrongly decided. Either way, it would seem hard to credit both cases as rightly
decided.
But even if Justices Scalia and Thomas were right about deference and the
force of law in Perez, their understanding of interpretative rules potentially suf-
fers from a different conceptual problem. Specifically, attempting to embed their
approach into the Mead regime risks descending into circular reasoning. Here's
how their argument would likely have to proceed if applied to Chevron: all inter-
pretative rules that receive Chevron deference carry the force of law, but to receive
a88. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57, 263 (1995)).
289. See Hickman, supra note 31, at 489.
ago. See Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 1o6, 114 (2002).
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Chevron deference under Mead the interpretative rule must carry the force of law.
While this vicious circle presents a thorny theoretical problem for the
Scalia/Thomas approach, it arguably matters little in practice; so long as a court
runs through the Mead factors and is satisfied that they are met, then the inter-
pretative rule possesses the authoritative indicia necessary to trigger Chevron,
which, in turn, simultaneously imbues the rule with the force of law. Moreover,
as I would argue based on the history presented in Part II, once the interpretative
rule is eligible for Chevron deference, it also satisfies Bennett and is reviewable
prior to enforcement. Therefore, even though the Scalia/Thomas approach sits
somewhat uneasily with Mead, it at least avoids the outright contradiction one
sees between the Perez majority and Mead, and it yields a unified test for both
Chevron eligibility and finality. On balance, this seems like a better choice than
straining to reconcile Perez's majority and Mead, especially in light of the practical
benefits I outline below in Section III.B.
All told, the doctrinal tensions teased out here are designed to illustrate the
complexities courts must now navigate in the wake of Chevron, Mead, Perez, and
Bennett-let alone Whitman and NPHA. Chevron, as modified by Mead, signifi-
cantly complicates the simple historical picture painted in Part II regarding the
deference afforded interpretative rules. The next Section attempts to apply sec-
tion 704's historical understanding in a post-Chevron, post-Mead world.
B. Applying a Unified Deference-Finality Doctrinal Framework
Based only on the history presented in Part II, one would reasonably con-
clude that those courts of appeals (including the D.C. Circuit) that categorically
exclude interpretative rules from finality were correct: because the generation
enacting the APA generally believed that interpretative rules and policy state-
ments do not carry the "force and effect of law," the D.C. Circuit's recent oppo-
sition to the pre-enforcement review of nonlegislative rules appears to be vindi-
cated.
However, the preceding historical examination also demonstrates that defer-
ence provided the key distinction separating interpretative rules - issued without
explicit congressional delegation of authority and therefore lacking legal ef-
fect"' -from the legislative rules backed by delegated authority, which carried
the force of law. Because Chevron deference trades out the traditional framework
of "Skidmore weight" for "Chevron space" when courts consider at least some
nonlegislative rules, it makes those reasonable agency interpretations conclusive
291. See Patten, supra note 227, at 376.
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on the courts. Under the prior understandings of legal effect, those agency in-
terpretations entitled to Chevron deference have the force and effect of law. They
are therefore final agency action under section 704 of the APA.
Of the three approaches sketched in Part I, only one appellate court -the
Sixth Circuit -has maintained that the granting of Chevron deference for any
agency interpretation, whether in the form of a legislative or nonlegislative rule,
is a sufficient indicator of finality.292 But the Sixth Circuit offered no justification
other than common-sense notions of fairness - the inherent wrongness that
seemed to stem from an agency claiming nonfinality today and then claiming
nearly conclusive interpretative authority tomorrow. A historical approach vin-
dicates the otherwise-ignored approach of the Sixth Circuit and places it on
stronger footing. If applied, this historical argument might prompt the D.C. Cir-
cuit to reconsider the current trajectory of its precedents and return to an ap-
proach that circuit itself helped spur in the late 198os.293
Constructing an administrable doctrine in line with the Sixth Circuit's posi-
tion is quite simple. When a private party challenges an agency interpretation
embedded in a nonlegislative rule in a pre-enforcement review proceeding, the
agency may respond by claiming that the action is not final. However, if the
agency wins on these grounds, it must also affirmatively concede that the inter-
pretation lacks the force and effect of law. If the court agrees, the agency cannot
later claim Chevron deference if the interpretation is challenged in a future en-
forcement proceeding. The court's initial finding that the interpretation lacked
the force and effect of law would serve as estoppel whenever the agency attempts
to argue for Chevron eligibility under Mead.294 However, if the agency calculates
that it would prefer to keep open the possibility of receiving Chevron deference
(as opposed to weaker Skidmore weight) in a later proceeding, it can decline to
292. Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 2004); Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v.
Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 927 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1991).
293. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
294. The D.C. Circuit has previously contemplated estoppel-like arguments in analogous agency
cases. For example, in Public Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 940 F.2d 679
(D.C. Cit. 1991), the court confronted a challenge to an agency's policy statement in which
the petitioners claimed the policy statement was, in truth, a legislative rule that could only be
promulgated with public notice and comment. The court recognized that the agency's litigat-
ing position that the policy statement did not amount to a legislative rule would potentially
"estop[] the Commission from arguing in the future that the policy was adopted as a substan-
tive rule" and thus moot the challengers' claim. Id. at 681. However, the court regarded that
point as "not altogether clear" and decided the case on ripeness grounds instead. Id. (citing
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Grain
Bd. of Iraq, 9 04 F.2d 732, 739 (D.C. Cit. 1990)).
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assert the nonfinality defense in the pre-enforcement challenge and seek to win
on the merits through heightened deference.s
The benefits of the preceding approach are twofold. First, the doctrine out-
lined above prioritizes flexibility-a fundamental concern of administrative
law.296 The doctrine offers an agency a simple choice that incentivizes it to adopt
a healthy mix of noncoercive methods and those that the agency anticipates
bringing to bear directly against regulated entities. For example, if the agency
believes that a given regulatory goal is achievable without resort to legal coer-
cion, it can defend against a challenge to an interpretative rule or policy state-
ment by claiming the mantle of nonfinality. Moreover, to the extent the agency
is unsure that the interpretative rule would pass Mead's test, it might never want
to test that question out of concern that a court would spurn its attempt to secure
Chevron deference and rule against it under Skidmore. Under such circumstances,
delaying review might be the preferable option. However, if the agency believes
that optimal compliance will eventually require it to seek an enforcement action
in district court against at least some significant segment of the regulated indus-
try, or if the agency is particularly confident that the rule satisfies Mead, it will
likely prefer to preserve Chevron deference. When an enforcement action looms,
the almost conclusive force of Chevron deference would be preferable to the less
definitive approach of delaying review. What the agency may not attempt is to
have it both ways - to secure nonfinality today and Chevron deference tomorrow.
The second benefit secured from the proposed test is certainty. One admitted
benefit of the D.C. Circuit approach is clarity - legislative rules are final and non-
legislative rules are not. While this is a perspicuous division, it misses the im-
portant reality of judicial deference. Meanwhile, the ad hoc approach of the
Ninth Circuit likely better reflects the variety in the coercive effects that nonleg-
islative rules impose on regulated parties but sacrifices the predictability of a
bright-line division. The framework advanced here possesses elements of both
approaches - a constrained flexibility that captures the best of both worlds.
Agencies would retain significant flexibility to choose whether to prioritize def-
erence (should the agency anticipate the need to enforce the interpretation in
order to secure compliance) or to prioritize unreviewability (should the agency
not anticipate much need for enforcement). And while the reformed doctrine
295. Admittedly, this tactic might operate differently between circuits that have held that section
704 of the APA is not jurisdictional and those that believe it is. There is currently a split in the
courts of appeals, and the ten circuits to address the question split equally five-to-five on
whether section 704's finality requirement is jurisdictional. See Sundeep Iyer, Comment, ju-
risdictional Rules and Final Agency Action, 125 YALE L.J. 785, 789 & nn.22-23 (2016). The D.C.
Circuit, the most popular forum for administrative law litigation, has adopted the nonjuris-
dictional view of section 704. See Marcum v. Salazar, 694 F.3d 123, 129 (D.C. Cit. 2012).
296. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
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would not have quite such a razor-sharp rule as that endorsed in Huerta, it would
trade out the seemingly ad hoc approach of the most pragmatically minded cir-
cuits for a simpler, more predictable inquiry: if the agency seeks Chevron defer-
ence and the interpretation qualifies, the interpretative rule is final agency action.
If the interpretation is ineligible for Chevron deference (or the agency expressly
waives its right to claim such deference in the future), the action is unreviewable
until applied or enforced.
This proposed procedure could have been used in American Tort Reform As-
sociation. Even though the D.C. Circuit used near-categorical anguage to pre-
clude pre-enforcement challenges to interpretative rules, the panel did discuss
the level of deference OSHA sought for its statutory interpretation.297 Citing
Chevron, the panel mentioned that OSHA itself recognized that its interpretation
should not be entitled to the "controlling weight" given to "agency regulations
with the force of law."298 The D.C. Circuit seemed to undertake this analysis to
refute the contention that the OSHA interpretation was, in fact, a legislative rule.
But nothing in Mead, Barnhart, or Christensen implies that an informal agency
interpretation, once granted Chevron deference, transmogrifies into a legislative
rule, a point affirmed in Perez.99 The more reasonable inference, and one the
D.C. Circuit has not yet made, is that while the level of deference doesn't change
the nature.of the agency action, it can change the finality of that action. Therefore,
the panel in American Tort Reform Association could have simply decided the case
on the narrow ground that because OSHA did not seek and would not be entitled
to Chevron deference, its interpretation did not have the force and effect of law,
and therefore was not final agency action.
Consider also Whitman, where the Court found an explanatory preamble -
a form of interpretative rule - to be final agency action.00 As Kevin Stack has
persuasively argued, because agency preambles go through the process of notice-
and-comment rulemaking, they are the product of precisely the same public-
facing procedures that produce legislative rules and are therefore entitled to
greater judicial deference than other forms of agency guidance.o301 In other
words, because legislative rules themselves are presumptively entitled to Chevron
deference under the "safe harbor" established by Mead, the same should apply to
explanatory preambles that accompany those legislative rules. On this view,
Whitman is justifiable, but again, based on a different rationale than that adopted
297. Am. Tort Reform Ass'n v. OSHA, 738 F.3d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
298. Id. (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009)).
299. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 n.4 (2015).
300. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
301. See Kevin M. Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1252, 1277 (2016).
2505
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
302
by the Court. Rather than ignoring Bennett's second prong, or relying on a
special judicial review provision applicable only to the Clean Air Act,30o a better
approach would have been to simply argue that the preamble had sufficient legal
consequence under Bennett as an interpretative rule to be considered final and
would be uniquely entitled to Chevron judicial deference under Mead.
Two other cases that ultimately reached the Supreme Court, however, are not
justifiable under this reconstructed approach to finality. First is NPIA, 304 when
the Court recognized that the policy statement at issue could not receive Chevron
deference, since NPS did not have authority to administer the statute. But if the
policy statement was ineligible for Chevron deference, it could not carry the force
and effect of law; the NPHA Court openly acknowledged as mucho.3 " Absent the
authority of a legislative rule or an interpretative rule receiving Chevron defer-
ence, a rule like the one in NPHA cannot produce a legal consequence sufficient
to satisfy Bennett's second prong. Therefore, the Court was wrong to hold that
the policy statement constituted final agency action. Second, in Gonzales v. Ore-
gon, the Supreme Court held that an interpretative rule from the Attorney Gen-
eral regarding drugs used in assisted-suicide procedures was not entitled to
Chevron deference against a pre-enforcement challenge.3 06 But the Ninth Circuit
held that the interpretative rule was final agency action without regard to the
applicable level of deference.0 While the Supreme Court was likely under no
302. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
See Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (admitting that
the policy statement did "not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing any-
thing;" did "not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power or authority;" did
"not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability;" and created "no legal rights or obliga-
tions" (quoting Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998))).
546 U.S. 243, 258 (20o6).
See supra notes 96-loo and accompanying text. While the Ninth Circuit found that the Attor-
ney General's interpretative regulation was not entitled to Chevron deference, it cursorily de-
cided the issue of finality first, so its disposition on the question of finality made no mention
of the applicable level of deference. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F-3d 1118, 1120, 1129 (9 th Cir.
2004). Meanwhile, Judge Wallace, who dissented from the result but concurred on reviewa-
bility, offered a more in-depth analysis of the finality issue, but nevertheless also failed to
consider the relationship between the applicable deference regime and the interpretation's fi-
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obligation to reconsider the Ninth Circuit's holding without the Attorney Gen-
eral pressing the finality defense before them,30 8 the general incompatibility be-
tween a rejection of Chevron and a finding of finality was clearly evident in Gon-
zales.
Curiously, the Department of Justice's Ninth Circuit brief in Gonzales argued
that the interpretation was sufficiently final for purposes of reviewability,o' but
also advocated for nothing more than Skidmore deference.31 o Under the frame-
work proposed here, the Department could make that choice (since finality
would be waivable and left to the agency's discretion), but could also have as-
serted a nonfinality defense, assuming that the rule would be granted nothing
greater than Skidmore deference in any future proceeding. More important, how-
ever, the Department's behavior in the Gonzales litigation demonstrates that
agencies might not always have monolithic preferences when it comes to finality
and deference. While one might assume that agencies generally prefer nonfinal-
ity (in order to delay litigating the substantive legal issue) and generally prefer
Chevron deference (in order to maximize their chance of victory on the underly-
ing issue), that might not always be the case. Ultimately, this framework leaves
the agencies a good deal of discretion to balance these two general preferences,
which is in line with the spirit of pragmatism that the Supreme Court continues
to emphasize in its finality precedents."'
One interesting twist of the procedure outlined above is that even if an
agency seeks Chevron deference, it might not receive it. The agency may not be
granted such deference either because (a) it fails the threshold test under Mead
for Chevron eligibility or (b) the statute is unambiguous.312 If the agency fails
either of these two tests, it could then argue, alternatively, that the nonlegislative
rule is not "final agency action," or it could waive the finality defense altogether
and argue that the court should reach the merits under Skidmore deference. But
308. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (describing the issue of whether finality is jurisdic-
tional under the APA).
309. Brief for Appellants at 14, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F-3d 1118 (2004) (No. 02-35587), 2002 WL
32290869, at *14.
310. Id. at *22-23.
311. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
312. The agency's interpretation might also not be accepted by the court if it is not "reasonable."
However, this stage of judicial review is not part of the determination for whether the agency
will receive deference; the agency has received deference and even with such heightened def-
erence, its interpretation flunked. Some might be tempted to distinguish this review of inter-
pretative rules from legislative rules, but the "reasonableness" threshold applies just as much
to judicial review of legislative rules. See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) ("[N]ot only must a regulation, in order to be valid, be
consistent with the statute, but it must be reasonable.").
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even if the agency ultimately wins on the alternative finality ground, the review-
ing court's first holding -that the agency's interpretation was not entitled to
Chevron deference - should preclude application of Chevron deference in future
proceedings.
This revised approach to the "legal effects" prong of Bennett would also pro-
vide greater structure to the inquiry and is more administrable than the haphaz-
ard approach that has persisted in courts thus far. Moreover, it could provide
some much-needed transparency in reviewing courts' determinations of agency
deference. By forcing agencies to consider the Chevron-Skidmore question as a
threshold matter, it is possible they (and the courts) will apply the current Mead
framework more consistently and transparently, and perhaps even allow the
Mead test to percolate toward something less confusing.'13
Of course, the proposal offered here is not perfect. For example, to the degree
that the Mead line of cases regarding Chevron eligibility remains confusing and
challenging to apply, it will remain confusing and challenging even if front-
loaded in the process of judicial review.314 Nevertheless, at least this proposal
313. For example, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer's seminal study of agency deference in the
Supreme Court found that 718 agency statutory interpretations out of the 1,014 the Court
encountered between 1984 and 2006 involved review of an informal interpretation. William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1148 (20o8). All
future numerical references from the Eskridge-Baer study come from the author's use of the
Eskridge and Baer dataset, which is publicly available. Replication Data For: The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, HARv. DATAVERSE (2011), http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId
=hdl:1902.1/16562 [http://perma.cc/3JBZ-KC9M]. Somewhat astoundingly, in only 23 of
those 718 cases did the Supreme Court cite Chevron, and in only io did the Court apply the
Chevron framework. And only four of those ten cases involved agency action approaching an
interpretative rule. Lower courts have taken a similar tack, having found Mead so challenging
to apply that they resort to engaging in "Chevron avoidance" by eliding the Chevron question
and granting Skidmore deference to informal agency interpretations. See Bressman, supra note
282, at 1457-58. Nevertheless, another recent study of the courts of appeals has found that
Chevron deference was still granted to roughly 45% of informal agency interpretations - ac-
counting for 173 total decisions. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Cir-
cuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REv. 1, 37-38 (2017). Perhaps by loading the Mead analysis into the
threshold matter of finality, this doctrinal innovation could spur some much-needed judicial
consideration of another challenging administrative law question.
314. That said, it's possible that Mead is simpler to apply in practice than in theory. For example,
in a recent survey of Mead's implications, Professor Hickman concluded that since the Court
decided Mead in 2001, it "has never actually extended Chevron deference to interpretations
lacking with notice-and-comment rulemaking or relatively formal adjudication procedures."
Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 548 (2014). And
many, but not all, courts of appeals "in practice seem quite simply to extend Chevron review
to the notice-and-comment regulations and formal adjudications." Id. at 550. If Mead truly
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would retain only one vexing question (how to apply Mead) instead of the cur-
rent system, which retains two vexing questions (how to apply Mead and
whether agency action has sufficient "legal effects" to warrant finality). For ex-
ample, under current finality doctrines, much rides on the characterization of the
agency action as either a legislative or nonlegislative rule. 15 But if finality hinges
on Mead instead of the "considerable smog" produced by the D.C. Circuit's prec-
edents, 316 then at least the Mead factors provide some minimal guidance that (a)
could be clarified through increased execution of the test and (b) could displace
the separate (and disparate) tests the D.C. Circuit has adopted over the years for
distinguishing legislative from nonlegislative rules.
Tying deference and finality together would potentially prove more admin-
istrable in practice than the status quo. The approach would also occupy a mid-
dle ground between the two extreme, all-or-nothing positions heretofore ex-
pressed. Contra some courts of appeals' rigid approaches, not all interpretative
rules should be categorically excluded from being "final agency action." And con-
tra the prevailing academic critiques of Bennett's second prong, not all interpre-
tative rules or policy statements should be "final agency action." That middle
ground would preserve administrative flexibility while also ensuring that there
are clear boundaries that agencies must respect that would allow regulated enti-
ties to structure their activities accordingly.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court and courts of appeals' inconsistent jurisprudence in the
area of administrative finality has been unsatisfying. In particular, the lower
courts continue to struggle to discern the finality of nonlegislative rules pursuant
to Bennett's legal-consequences prong and have developed a variety of competing
confined Chevron to only those agency rules promulgated through public notice and com-
ment, then Part II's historical discussion would seem to straightforwardly apply today: be-
cause interpretative rules generally are not promulgated through notice-and-comment rule-
making, they are not eligible for Chevron deference and therefore are not "final agency action."
However, even Professor Hickman acknowledged that Barnhart's later gloss on Mead has
spurred some courts to take a more nuanced approach to agency guidance documents, see id.
at 551-52, and Hickman has affirmatively argued that certain IRS guidance documents have
the force and effect of law, and therefore should be eligible for Chevron deference, see id. at 552-
53; see also Hickman, supra note 31, at 529. Moreover, the lower courts' failure to apply Mead's
and Barnhart's nuance is "not quite doctrinally accurate." Hickman, supra, at 551. Assuming
that Perez did not abrogate Mead, a doctrinally faithful approach to Mead and Barnhart must
account for the possibility that some interpretative rules are eligible for Chevron deference.
315. See supra notes 275-277 and accompanying text.
316. Am. Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cit. 1980); see also supra notes 37-40
and accompanying text.
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approaches. Importantly, the D.C. Circuit's recent turn toward a more categori-
cal exclusion of interpretative rules demonstrates the growing barrier that Ben-
nett's legal-consequences prong erects for the pre-enforcement review of nonleg-
islative rules. At the same time, the academic scholarship grows increasingly
skeptical of Bennett's second prong.
Instead of calling for a wholesale rejection of Bennett's second prong or a
wholesale rejection of pre-enforcement review for interpretative rules, this Note
charts a middle course. Based on the theories, commentary, and case law existing
prior to and contemporaneously with the APA, I conclude that Bennett's second
prong rests on sound historical footing in concluding that legal consequence is
essential for securing pre-enforcement review. Likewise, the D.C. Circuit's recent
focus on interpretative rules lacking the force of law finds historical parallel in
the era surrounding the APA's adoption. Nevertheless, that historical parallel
does not justify a categorical rule precluding pre-enforcement review of inter-
pretative rules. The persistence of Chevron deference, as modified and cabined
by Mead and its progeny, grants at least some interpretative rules the "force of
law" that they historically lacked. The Sixth Circuit and two Supreme Court Jus-
tices recognized this connection between interpretive deference, although they
never attempted to relate this connection back to the APA's history. This Note
has sought to buttress these earlier insights and explain how a unified deference-
finality doctrine might work in practice. Ultimately, if courts were to explicitly
connect the second prong of Bennett o the existing regime of Chevron deference,
they may finally make that prong administrable as applied to nonlegislative rules
and bring greater coherence to a doctrine in desperate need of reform.
2510
127:2448 2018

